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Drug-War Psychology
I read with keen interest Raul
Barrios M oron’s article, “Bolivia:
T he Psychology o f Drug W ar”
(Hemisphere, Fall 1991). He indi
cates that at least one side o f the
“drug war” is im plem enting an im
p o rtan t part o f low-in tensity con
flict doctrine—psychological
warfare. I am careful to say one
side because I suspect that the
“o th er side” is also using tech
niques th at could be defined as
psychological warfare tactics. In
deed, using Barrios M oron’s own
definition o f psychological warfare,
his article would constitute a psy
chological warfare operation, an at
tem pt to win the hearts and m inds
o f the readers by m anipulation of
the inform ation.
Barrios M oron’s m anipulation
o f the inform ation is obviously
slanted against the Bolivian mili
tary’s involvement in the drug war.
This is not, however, a condem na
tion of the au th o r’s view. Given
Bolivia’s authoritarian history, a
concern for the continuation of Bo
livian dem ocracy against the back
drop of increased militarization is
certainly valid.
O f even greater concern,
though, is the ossification of view
points into two distinct camps. This
is precisely what the au th o r is accus
ing the Bolivian military of doing,
creating an either you’re “for us”
o r “against us” attitude by m anipu
lating inform ation. He shows his
bias by his contradictory statem ents
concerning who is responsible for
the military’s antidrug role, his fail
ure to include the plethora of mili
tary literature that cautions against
the exclusive use o f the military in
such a role, and by not following
through with a suggested alterna
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tive course o f action even after
identifying an institutional weak
ness that he cites as a contributing
cause o f the m ilitarization.

Low-intensity
warfare— the category
under which drug
operations are
included— is not a
“Western doctrine.
It can be seen in the
writings of Mao
Tse-tung (Protracted
War, Guerilla War)
and Che Guevara
(Guerrilla Warfare).

”

Barrios M oron states that the
poster “conveys an unequivocal un
derstanding o f the military’s selfappointed role.” Self-appointed?
O n page 14 he cites the US gov
ern m e n t’s financial support and
technical backing for the Bolivian
army’s psychological warfare opera
tions. O n page 16 he alludes to the
US role in the militarization effort:
“the poster asserts the Bolivian—as
opposed to US—origins o f the anti
drug cam paign,” and refers to the
“strategic impositions o f the US
drug war.” In addition, on page 15,
he cites the signing o f the USBolivian bilateral drug agreem ent,
“u n d er which President Jaim e Paz
Zam ora agreed to o rd er the Boliv
ian army into the war on drugs.”
How could Barrios M oron argue

that the military is “ap p o in tin g ”
itself when he writes in the same
article that they were ord ered into
the “war” by their democratically
elected leader, who is heavily influ
enced by the US.
T he author also believes the
poster warns “that Bolivia’s cu rren t
rural developm ent program , Desarrollo Altemativo, seems to have be
come a m ere com plem ent for an
incipient cam paign o f low-intensify
warfare.” A m ere com plem ent? O r
a m atter o f perspective? A plethora
of literature in the military/lowintensity conflict field strongly ar
gues for alternative developm ent
program s as part o f the overall
strategy and strongly cautions
against using the military instru
m ent as the sole instrum ent to ad
dress insurgencies— the category
u n d er which drug operations are
included.
This is not a “W estern” doctrine.
It can be seen in the writings of
Mao Tse-tung (Protracted War,
Guerilla War) and Che Guevara
( Guerrilla Warfare), even though it
is no t specifically labeled “psycho
logical warfare.” Some o f the most
prolific writers urging th at social
developm ent be m ade the major
thrust in counterinsurgency opera
tions are m em bers o f the military.
T here is far too m uch literature
in the field to review here, b u t a re
cent article by US Army Captain
Michael Ligon, a special forcesqualified military intelligence offi
cer, addresses this professional
concern. H e cites US Army Field
Manual 100-20, Military Operations
in Low-intensity Conflict, which iden
tifies the integrated approach of
political, econom ic, and military
operations necessary for counterin
surgency and counternarcotics op
erations to be successful. Captain

Ligon expresses the concern that
this coordinated approach, while
cu rren t in the US, is n o t being
addressed in the overseas coun
ternarcotics strategy. “T he weak
link lies in n o t having an econom ic
alternative to offer drug producing
nations. . . . In the war on drugs, a
purely military approach is no t the
answer” (“LIC, C ounternarcotics
and Small-Scale A griculture,” Spe
cial Warfare: The Professional Bulletin
of thefohn F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School, W inter 1991).
Captain Ligon offers a two
pronged econom ic strategy to ad
dress this problem . T he first is a
program of the Benson Institute
for Small-Scale Agriculture that al
locates a certain am ount o f land to
crops th at provide a well-balanced
diet while still raising the farm er’s
average annual incom e. Captain
Ligon states th at this program has
already proved to be successful in
Ecuador. T he second strategy is
based on a program of the Founda
tion for the Prom otion and Devel
o p m en t o f M icroenterprise that
distributes low-interest loans to
m arket vendors in the “inform al
sector” of La Paz, Bolivia.
Finally, Barrios M oron states
that “contributing to the military’s
renew ed sense o f mission and in
dispensability has been the institu
tional breakdown o f the police,
caused by widespread drug-related
co rru p tio n .” Despite his identifica
tion o f the role the police are play
ing in the changing role o f the
military, no where does Barrios
M oron call for the reconstitution
o f the police force. He is no t alone
in this. T here appears to be a great
deal o f research on the military
and num erous calls for a reduction
in the military’s role in civil affairs,
b u t little research and support for

the institution that is the most
likely to replace the vacuum left
should the military retu rn to a
purely external defense role: the
police.
In reality it is drug trafficking
that is the threat to Bolivian na
tional security and the consolida
tion of their democracy. It is drug
trafficking that the people have
tu rn ed to because of their extrem e
poverty and it is drug trafficking
that has resulted in the US “strate
gic im positions.” It now appears
that the psychological warfare oper
ations o f both sides have been a
success. T here is no serious talk of
econom ic and agricultural pro
grams, n or talks to address what
institution has the strength to en 
force any democratically enacted
law should the military leave the in
ternal security arena. Failure to
com prehend the desperation felt
by b oth sides in this escalating
“war,” as well as the resultant lack
o f negotiations, are the real threats
to Bolivian democracy.
Sgt. Cliff Nelson
M etro-Dade Police D epartm ent
Miami, Florida
Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed
are those of the author alone, and not
necessarily those of the Metro-Dade
Police Department.

Regarding Sovereignty
Irving Louis Horowitz’s “Shadow
o f a N ation” (Hemisphere, W in ter/
Spring 1992) provides an excellent
analysis o f why Panam a is an excep
tional and atypical Latin American
nation. Indeed, in many respects, it
is an artificial nation. But w hen he
ventures into policy recom m enda
tions that follow from his charac
terizations, he falls into all sorts of
perceptual traps. T hat the Reagan
and Bush adm inistrations followed
the same logic makes it no less re
grettable.
T he Carter-Torrijos treaties at
least held ou t the prom ise th at the
bitterness and enmity o f US-Panam anian relations could be ended,
that the US would withdraw grad
ually from Panam a, and th at the
long-sought Panam anian control
over the canal would be achieved.
A lthough the withdrawal has been
a reluctant process, and its spirit
violently devastated by the US inva
sion o f 1989, at least the tim etable
has been observed. Horowitz's view
o f US vital interests—which he did
recognize m ight be “real or pre
sum ed”—calls into question the
whole strategic concept on which
the treaties were based. And his ar
gum ents that certain Panam anian
postures cannot be tolerated by the
US are the thinnest kind of ration-
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Letters to the Editor

alization for whatever blatant viola
tions o f Panam anian sovereignty
this country m ight carry out. H oro
witz is saying, in effect, we really
d id n ’t m ean it when we signed
those treaties. Too bad, but we’re
big and you’re small.
We did take Panam a, as Teddy
Roosevelt liked to boast. But surely
that sort of power politics in USLatin Am erican relations has out
lived its usefulness. Violent and
extraordinarily destructive inva
sions o f sovereign states, like the
1989 invasion o f Panama, coupled
with the forcible kidnapping of a
head of state— legitim ate o r not—
set dangerous precedents that will
h au n t us in the future. To hold
th at US law applies anywhere and
that we will enforce it anywhere is
an outrageous extension o f sover

eignty, the very sovereignty that
Horowitz wants to deny to small
countries like Panama.
Horowitz appears to base m uch
of his argum ent on the strategic
necessity o f the Panam a Canal—a
waterway whose strategic and eco
nom ic value has steadily declined—
and extends the logic to the right
of the US to fix the neutrality of
Panam a. T hat logic, perfectly con
sistent with the Reagan-Bush view
o f the world, is a perverse justifica
tion for an endless series o f mis
chievous follies and police-like
interventions around the continent
and the globe. If Panam a is indeed
a “shadow o f a nation,” m uch of
the blam e for that lies on the US.
For most o f Panam a’s history as an
“in d ep en d e n t” state, it has been
caught in the shadow o f the US,

Links
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subjected to the worst sort of sub
jugation, split down its m iddle by a
zone where foreign law ruled, and
corrupted by constant interference
in its politics by US proconsuls.
T hat the country becam e a “politi
cal shadow w ithout state substance”
should be no surprise. Even a rea
sonable chance at en d u rin g politi
cal developm ent was precluded by
the relationship between the two
countries.
“In a world of strategic consid
erations,” Horowitz argues, “those
o f sovereignty are at times pre
em p ted .” Indeed, they are, and
therein lies the tragedy o f recent
US foreign policy. T h at policy has
been characterized by a sort o f poli
tics of the bully, in which the US
flexes its muscle and applies its
military power only in safe situa
tions. G renada, Panam a, Nicara
gua, and Iraq are the m ost recent
examples. Doing so does n o t legiti
m ate it, and the disregard o f na
tional sovereignty in favor o f a
blatant hegem onic role for this
country is a two-edged sword. A
nation, superpow er or not, that ig
nores long-standing principles of
international law, the Rio treaty,
and the UN C harter, simply cannot
have it both ways. W hen we disre
gard sovereignty, we weaken the
very foundation o f orderly inter
national relations. We cannot ar
gue for world o rd e r at the same
time we are ignoring world institu
tions like the International C ourt
o f Justice (as in the Nicaraguan
case).
I fear that Horowitz’s logic is
only a thinly veiled and weakly ar
gued rationalization and apology
for foreign policies th at insult
o ther states, weaken respect for
international law, and do a great
disservice to any hopes that the US
m ight stand for som ething noble
in the world. T he people o f Pana
ma, and the rest o f Latin America,
deserve better.
Jack W. Hopkins
School o f Public
and Environm ental Affairs
Indiana University
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Risky Business? The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
by Susan Kaufman Purcell

he stated purpose of
Congressm an Robert
T oricelli’s (D-NJ) “Cuban
Democracy Act o f 1992,”
introduced in the House
o f Representatives on Feb
ruary 5, 1992, is the prom otion of
“a peaceful transition to democracy
in C uba.” It is m ore likely, how
ever, th at the proposed bill will un
derm ine the good relations that
exist between the US and its dem o
cratic friends in the hem isphere
and Europe while falling far short
o f its stated goal.
T he authors o f the so-called
Toricelli bill adm it that “events
in the form er Soviet U nion and
Eastern Europe have dramatically
reduced C uba’s external support
and threaten C uba’s food and oil
supplies.” They also acknowledge
that C uba’s econom y will no t “sur
vive cu rren t trends.” T he problem ,
as they see it, is that Fidel C astro’s
“intransigence” makes it m ore
likely th at “there could be a col
lapse o f the Cuban economy, social
upheaval, or widespread suffering.”
They imply that their bill would
prevent that unhappy outcom e and
allow the C uban people a peaceful
transition to dem ocratic rule, and
they propose to achieve this end
with a com bination o f sanctions
and incentives.
T he chosen incentives are the
least problem atic as they include
some policies already in effect.

T

Susan Kaufman Purcell is vice presi
dent of the Department of Latin Ameri
can Affairs at the Americas Society in
New York City. She is co-editor of Latin
America: US Policy after the Cold
War (New York: Americas Society,
1991).
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This is the case regarding their rec
om m endation that telecom m unica
tions between the US and Cuba be
perm itted, along with paym ents to
Cuba for the services it provides.
This is also true regarding the
provision for the US president to
provide aid through nongovern
m ental organizations for individu
als and groups prom oting peaceful
dem ocratic change in Cuba. New
policies proposed in the bill would
allow donations o f food and the ex
p o rt o f m edicines to Cuba. (At pres
ent, m edicines can be donated, but
n o t exported.)

The Toricelli bill
would scuttle current
negotiations to
establish a North
Americanfree-trade
area and could
undermine antidrug
programs in the
Andean countries.

The authors o f the bill, however,
consider incentives alone insuffi
cient to guarantee a peaceful tran
sition to democracy. Am ong o ther
measures, they advocate a tight
ening o f the sanctions already in
place against Cuba. T he current
em bargo only prohibits trade be
tween the US and Cuba, no t be
tween third countries or even
subsidiaries o f US com panies lo

cated in third countries and Cuba.
T he Toricelli bill, however, would
change this situation by bro ad en 
ing the em bargo. Specifically it
would prohibit ships that en ter
Cuban ports to trade with Cuba
from loading and unloading cargo
in US ports within 180 days o f visit
ing Cuba. In addition, it would
deny tax deductions to US subsidi
aries for otherwise deductible ex
penses on the portion o f their
incom e that is based on trade with
Cuba.
T he Toricelli bill would also
penalize countries providing assis
tance to Cuba in any form, includ
ing trade subsidies and grants, by
m aking them ineligible for US aid,
inclusion in free-trade agreem ents
and debt-reduction program s, or
participation in the E nterprise for
the Americas Initiative. This sec
tion o f the bill seems to be aim ed
at Latin Am erica and, if im ple
m ented, would seriously u n d er
m ine cu rren t US policy toward the
region. For one thing, it would scut
tle cu rren t negotiations to establish
a N orth A m erican free-trade area,
since Mexico would refuse to let
W ashington dictate the n ature of
its relationship with third coun
tries. For another, it could u n d er
m ine drug-eradication program s in
the A ndean countries and prevent
new accords pattern ed on the
Brady Plan from being signed with
im portant d ebtor countries like
Brazil and Argentina.
The sponsors o f the bill seem to
believe that the US has m ore to
gain than to lose by offering Latin
American countries a choice be
tween going along with a tougher
US policy toward C uba o r going
their own way and foregoing US
aid. They are wrong. A N orth
Am erican free-trade agreem ent,

new debt-relief plans, and US aid
to Latin Am erican countries to cur
tail drug production and traffick
ing are n o t examples o f US charity
o r sacrifice. Instead they are poli
cies that ultimately will benefit the
US at least as m uch as Latin Amer
ica. Consequently, sanctions that
risk destroying such program s are
irrational and self-defeating.
O f course, these tougher sanc
tions would com e into play only if
the Latin A m erican countries
chose to continue trading o r pro
viding assistance to C astro’s Cuba.
In theory they could decide to
change their cu rren t policies in
o rd e r to avoid triggering the new
sanctions. T he reality, however, is
m ore com plicated. Latin America
does n o t like to be told what to do
by W ashington. It is very sensitive
to US threats to its sovereignty, for
well-known historical reasons. The
en d o f the Cold War has produced
a welcome im provem ent in USLatin A m erican relations and the
reduction o f anti-US sentim ents,
b u t nothing could b etter guarantee
a resurgence o f the old distrust and
animosity than an effort by Wash
ington to force Latin America to
ad opt its C uba policy.
O th er areas o f the world less
d ep e n d en t on US aid than Latin
Am erica would be affected by the
proposed bill less directly. Canada,
W estern Europe, and Japan, how
ever, all trade or have financial rela
tions with Cuba and would no t take
kindly to a law prohibiting their ves
sels that docked in C uban ports
from loading or unloading cargo
in US ports for 180 days.
Is it really worth it for the US to
risk seriously dam aging its relations
with im portant allies in o rd er to
achieve its policy goals in Cuba?
T he answer m ight have been “yes”

during the Cold War, when C uba’s
alliance with the USSR posed a seri
ous strategic threat, but this is no
longer the case. W ithout the USSR,
Cuba reverts to what it was before
C astro’s turn to both com m unism
and the Soviet U nion—a relatively

Is it really worth it for
the US to risk seriously
damaging its relations
with important allies
in order to achieve its
policy goals in Cuba ?
The answer might
have been “yes
during the Cold War,
but no longer is it so.

”

poor island country with ten mil
lion people. It is therefore difficult
to argue that a policy o f accelerat
ing the collapse o f an already col
lapsing C uban economy, o r even of
ensuring a peaceful transition from
dictatorship to dem ocracy in Cuba,
justifies underm ining US relations
with im portant friendly dem ocra
cies that wish to pursue different
policies toward Cuba.
M oreover, it is unclear how a
policy that would accelerate the
econom ic collapse o f Cuba, while
sim ultaneously offering possibili
ties for increased US-Cuban com 
m unication, would be any m ore
successful than the cu rren t US pol

icy toward Cuba in bringing about
a peaceful transition to democracy.
T he assum ption seems to be th at in
creasing the pressure on Castro will
leave him with no alternative b u t to
accept an econom ic and political
opening. Yet the opposite may be
the case. Castro is now in tern atio n 
ally isolated; his few rem aining
friends are alm ost exclusively o th er
dictatorships. By penalizing coun
tries that trade with or provide aid
to Cuba, the US could en d up caus
ing these countries to defend and
possibly help Cuba as a way o f p u n 
ishing the US for encroaching on
their sovereign rights.
C hanging the cu rren t policy by
broadening the em bargo would
also distract world attention from
what Castro is doing to his own peo
ple and focus it instead on what
the US is doing to Cuba. In addi
tion, it would underm ine the
broad consensus that exists within
the US regarding Cuba, and US
policy toward Cuba, in ways that
would be rem iniscent o f the u n 
happy conflict over C entral Ameri
can policy that dom inated the
1980s. It is difficult to see how ei
th er developm ent would advance
US interests in Cuba.
T he best US policy toward
C uba is the cu rren t US policy. It
has broad support within the US, is
already accepted by m ost o f o ur
dem ocratic friends abroad, and it
is contributing to the collapse of
C uban com m unism . Adm ittedly it
does no t guarantee a peaceful dem 
ocratic transition in Cuba, b u t nei
th er does the proposed “C uban
Democracy Act o f 1992.” ■

Editor’s Note: Testimony presented to
the House Committee on Foreign Af
fairs, March 25, 1992.
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Stopping Airborne Drug Traffickers
by R ichard J. Baum

t is time the US escalated the
war against drugs by giving
federal drug-interdiction agen
cies the authority to shoot
down drug-trafficking planes.
N othing short of direct force is
sufficient to deter the pilots who
routinely shuttle their deadly cargo
o f processed cocaine between the
eastern coast o f South America and
the Caribbean. The US govern
m ent already possesses the trained
personnel and equipm ent to allow
such force to be used w ithout seri
ous risk to the innocent. It may not
be long before Congress realizes
that appropriating billions o f dol
lars a year for drug interdiction is
meaningless if US agencies do not
have the authority to use force.
Surely it would be preferable to
employ nonviolent m eans to cap
ture, try, convict, and incarcerate
airborne drug traffickers. These
days, however, US law enforcem ent
agencies never capture a traffick
ing pilot. Trafficker tactics, com 
bined with the legal constraints
within which US agencies work,
have m ade trafficking pilots the
untouchables of the drug trade.
Only by altering its approach and
encouraging o ur hem ispheric allies
to do the same can the US govern
m ent com bat the threat posed to
its citizens.

I

War against Drugs
The phrase “war against drugs” is
misleading. It suggests that US

Richard J. Baum is a Republican staff
member of the House Select Committee
on Narcotics Abuse and Control. The
views expressed in the article are his
alone, and not those of the House Select
Committee.
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agencies are authorized to fight
drugs as they would any grave na
tional security threat: by employing
all necessary force to protect US
lives. T he Persian G ulf War, rather
than the current battle against
drug trafficking, m uch m ore accu
rately reflects what US citizens envi
sion as a true war. D uring the Gulf
War the US arm ed forces devel
oped the plans and deployed the
resources necessary to fulfill the
mission outlined by President
George Bush and his staff. It then
im plem ented those plans until the
m ission’s objectives were met.
C om pared with the Iraqi army,
the enem y in the struggle against
drugs is an evasive target indeed.
Major cocaine traffickers are not
lim ited to national territories or to
particular bases o f operation. They
are dispersed throughout the An
dean region in countries that do
not possess the capabilities to elim
inate them , even if, as in the case
o f Colombia, they have the will to
fight them aggressively. T he “sol
diers” o f drug organizations are
no t easily identifiable. T he m ost im
p ortant personnel in the cartels are
m ore likely to be “business peo
p le”—bankers and lawyers toting
brief cases— than uniform ed sol
diers carrying m achine guns.
Thus US forces cannot enter
foreign nations to capture and kill
the soldiers of the drug cartels. Yet,
when a plane load o f the cartel’s
deadly product enters interna
tional airspace destined for the US,
the question becom es altogether
different.
The US does no t have to con
tinue its struggle with international
drug traffickers in a m anner that
makes the struggle impossible to
win. Obviously the US governm ent
cannot send its air force on a few

thousand sorties to destroy the
Latin American cocaine cartels.
Still, there is no reason why US
air-interdiction agencies cannot be
instructed to adjust their rules of
engagem ent to include the p ru 
d ent application of force against
airborne drug traffickers. T he rules
o f engagem ent can, and should, be
altered.
Every conflict has its rules of
engagem ent. Even in the Persian
G ulf War— a seemingly all-out ef
fort— US forces were instructed to
attack only what were classified as
military targets in o rd er to m ini
mize civilian casualties. The use of
force is a continuum , the level em 
ployed being d ep en d en t on politi
cal and military objectives as well as
the capabilities of the enemy. In
the case o f fighting airborne drug
traffickers, it is imperative the
continuum be shifted towards
greater use o f force because the
current level has proved to be in
sufficient.
T he network o f planes and pi
lots controlled by a drug cartel is
perhaps its greatest vulnerability.
T he entire drug-cartel enterprise is
heavily d ep en d en t on air transpor
tation. In the coca-growing regions
of P eru and Bolivia, traffickers fly
in the critical chemicals and sup
plies used in coca processing and
then fly out the cocaine paste or
base to processing sites. O nce the
cocaine is fully processed, m ost of
it is flown out of the Andes, occa
sionally to US territorial waters, or,
m ore commonly, to the Caribbean,
n o rth ern Guatemala, or southern
Mexico for transport across the
US-Mexico border. T hough a sig
nificant am ount of cocaine is trans
ported on cargo ships, traffickers
m uch prefer the speed and control
provided by air transport.

A Shoot-Down Policy
If the US governm ent initiates a
“shoot-down” policy against traf
ficking planes in international air
space, then o th er governm ents will
likely take similar action within
their own borders. Strategically key
governm ents, such as those of
Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, have
already shown interest in, as well as
lim ited capability of, forcing down
or shooting down trafficking air
craft. With the US governm ent
leading by exam ple while provid
ing technical and intelligence assis
tance to o th er governm ents and
air-interdiction agencies, drug-

an o th er safety m easure, it could be
required that the drugs be recov
ered and tested by US personnel
positioned on land or sea, who
would quickly com m unicate the re
sults to the US plane. Finally, con
tinual efforts to com m unicate with
the trafficking plane, in o rd er to
convince the pilot to land, would
also have to be required. Traffick
ing pilots who wanted to avoid
being shot down would turn them 
selves in and face charges in the
US. Such pilots would serve as ex
cellent sources for US intelligence.
Im plem enting such safeguards,
especially that o f testing the sus
pected cargo, would be time
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and on the ground, and targets
would be chosen only if intelli
gence reports had suggested when
and where the drugs were to be
dropped.
Perhaps US antidrug forces
would not shoot down a plane
every day, but even a handful of
“exam ples” would serve as a p otent
deterrent. Moreover, costs to traf
fickers would rise as pilots de
m anded escalating fees. If enough
planes were shot down, it could
even becom e difficult for traffick
ers to find pilots with the ap propri
ate training and lack o f regard for
personal safety to transport their
drugs. And if the A ndean and Mexirients were to jo in such
p balance o f power in
: would substantially
ots aim ed at airborne
ers would be heard
ivorld, sending the
;very trafficker that
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A Shoot-Down Policy
If the US governm ent initiates a
“shoot-down” policy against traf
ficking planes in international air
space, then o th er governm ents will
likely take similar action within
their own borders. Strategically key
governm ents, such as those of
Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, have
already shown interest in, as well as
lim ited capability of, forcing down
or shooting down trafficking air
craft. With the US governm ent
leading by exam ple while provid
ing technical and intelligence assis
tance to o th er governm ents and
air-interdiction agencies, drugtrafficking organizations would be
substantially weakened. Such an airinterdiction strategy may represent
the US governm ent’s best chance
o f cutting the flow of cocaine to its
national shores.
O f course, the most im portant
drawback o f using force against
airborne drug traffickers is the
chance o f m aking a mistake—of
shooting down and possibly killing
individuals who are not involved in
drug trade. T hough a degree of
risk is inevitable, it m ust be rem em 
b ered that such risk is always in
volved in serious operations o f law
enforcem ent and national security.
Most certainly the risk m ust be m in
imized. H ence, if US agencies do
receive shoot-down authority, they
must be allowed to operate only
within narrow confines that mini
mize the use of force to the most
appropriate circumstances.
Sorting the good guys from the
bad guys can be difficult for airinterdiction agencies because drug
traffickers are able to mix in with
h u ndreds o f o th er small aircraft on
legitim ate flights. Fortunately traf
fickers give themselves away when
they drop drugs from the hold of
their planes, since they generally
do n o t land during delivery opera
tions. Considering US surveillance
and intelligence capabilities, it
would not be difficult to require
that, p rio r to the use o f force, the
drug drop be witnessed by an air
borne law-enforcement officer. As

a n o th er safety m easure, it could be
required that the drugs be recov
ered and tested by US personnel
positioned on land or sea, who
would quickly com m unicate the re
sults to the US plane. Finally, con
tinual efforts to com m unicate with
the trafficking plane, in o rd er to
convince the pilot to land, would
also have to be required. Traffick
ing pilots who wanted to avoid
being shot down would turn them 
selves in and face charges in the
US. Such pilots would serve as ex
cellent sources for US intelligence.
Im plem enting such safeguards,
especially that o f testing the sus
pected cargo, would be time
consum ing. N onetheless, if shootdown authority were granted, the
US governm ent would alter its in
terdiction operations. Instead of
dispersing resources in an effort to
patrol an entire area where traf
fickers m ight be, it would focus on
single trafficking planes. Multiple
assets would be deployed in the air

and on the ground, and targets
would be chosen only if intelli
gence reports had suggested when
and where the drugs were to be
dropped.
Perhaps US antidrug forces
would not shoot down a plane
every day, but even a handful of
“exam ples” would serve as a p otent
deterrent. Moreover, costs to traf
fickers would rise as pilots de
m anded escalating fees. If enough
planes were shot down, it could
even becom e difficult for traffick
ers to find pilots with the ap propri
ate training and lack o f regard for
personal safety to transport their
drugs. And if the A ndean and Mexi
can governm ents were to jo in such
an effort, the balance o f power in
the drug war would substantially
shift. T he shots aim ed at airborne
drug traffickers would be heard
around the world, sending the
message to every trafficker that
the war against drugs had truly
com m enced. ■
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Costa Rica’s Export Strategy
by M a ty A. Clark

osta Rica is widely re
garded as the success
story o f the Caribbean
Basin, rebounding as it
did from econom ic crisis
in the early 1980s to its
cu rren t position as a regional
leader in export-led growth strat
egies. T he country fought its way
back from rock-bottom statistics in
1982: a debt-service ratio of m ore
than 50%, nearly 100% inflation,
and a 40% drop in real wages, not
to m ention a three-year record of
sinking p er capita GDP. To make
m atters worse, Costa Rica de
faulted on its foreign debt in
1981—m onths before Mexico did
so—and eventually accum ulated
one o f the w orld’s highest per cap
ita external debts. For the first time
since 1949, there was serious con
cern about the possibility o f social
unrest threatening the regime.
Changes in the world economy
and regional geopolitics had
abruptly closed off some develop
m ent options and presented oth
ers. The old m odel—based on
im port substitution and externally
financed state investm ent—ran out
of steam. In this setting the Costa
Rican governm ent fell u n d er in
tense domestic and foreign pres
sure to adopt a new strategy, based
on deregulating the economy and
reorienting production toward m ar
kets outside of C entral America.
This new strategy prom ised Costa
Rica the benefits of new opportuni-

Mary A. Clark is a doctoral candidate
in political science at the University of
Wisconsin at Madison. She is co-author
of “Non-Traditional Agricultural Ex
ports in Latin America: A Reapprais
al, ” Latin Am erican Research
Review (Spring 1992).
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ties— the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI), the globalization o f produc
tion, and plenty of foreign aid to
sm ooth the transition.

In spite of Costa Rica’s
short-term success,
several problems call
into question the
sustainability of its
nontraditional export
strategy.

Costa Rica’s recovery since the
early 1980s has indeed been im pres
sive: the country rem ains politically
stable and, while the distribution of
incom e may have becom e m ore un
equal and the external debt con
tinues to m enace, indicators of
econom ic growth, inflation, em 
ployment, and real wages have im
proved significantly. Perhaps most
impressive o f all, the country’s non
traditional exports have boom ed,
well-balanced as they are between
agricultural products, seafood, and
light m anufactures. Clothing assem
bly, flowers and ornam ental plants,
fresh and frozen fish and shrim p,
and fresh pineapple lead these new
export industries.
Can the spectacular export
growth of the 1980s provide a sta
ble basis for a new developm ent
model? How do nontraditional ex
ports contribute to national devel
opm ent needs?

Sustainability
In spite of Costa Rica’s short-term
success, several problem s call into
question the sustainability of its
nontraditional export strategy. Per
haps the most serious and im m e
diate problem is the sheer cost of
prom oting nontraditional exports.
T he expense exacts a heavy toll on
both the fiscal budget and the bal
ance o f trade. T he most pressing
issue involves the m ain fiscal in
centive to nontraditional export
ers: an export-tax credit known as
the Certificado de Abono Tributario
(CAT). CATs were originally
awarded to firms exporting n o n 
traditional com m odities regardless
o f the com pany’s nationality, size,
geographic location, or product
line, with the provision that the ex
ports m ust contain a m inim um of
35% national value-added. T he taxcredit certificate equals up to 20%
of the FOB value o f a firm ’s no n 
traditional exports and is negotia
ble on the Costa Rican stock
exchange.
In the late 1980s the CAT pro
gram came u n d er fire from both
within the adm inistration of Oscar
Arias and from the W orld Bank for
draining the public-sector budget.
CAT expenditures were 19 times
greater in 1989 than they were in
1984, and by 1990 they were ex
pected to account for 8% o f the
central governm ent’s budget.
Given substantial fiscal deficits,
docum ented cases o f corruption in
the CAT system, and evidence that
a few large com panies benefited
disproportionately from the pro
gram, CATs are being gradually re
duced. Investors warn, however,
that reducing CATs makes export
ing less attractive, especially for do
mestic firms, and they predict a

consequent serious dow nturn in
the growth o f nontraditional ex
ports.
A nother problem linked to ris
ing exports is th at o f rising im
ports. Many o f Costa Rica’s
nontraditional exports are light
m anufactures—apparel being the
prim e exam ple— that are assem
bled and exported by foreign firms
enjoying the tax-free entry o f input
materials. By subsidizing these im
ports to the previously m entioned
extent, the Costa Rican govern
m en t is prom oting budget deficits
by n o t taking advantage o f this po
tential source o f tax revenue. M ore
over, it is perpetuating some o f the
basic problem s th at neoliberals
have stressed in their critiques of
the n atio n ’s long-standing policy of
im port-substitution developm ent:
local dep en d en ce on foreign sup
plies, trade deficits, and inflation.
In the case o f nontraditional ex
p o rt firms, dependence on foreign
supplies ranges from office sup
plies to pre-cut fabric and ma
chinery.
Aside from the debate about the
econom ic costs of export prom o
tion, considerable political contro
versy surrounds the questions of
who should direct export-prom otion efforts and how the new strat
egy should be im planted into the
country’s institutional structure.
Several Costa Rican officials feel
th at external involvement in n o n 
traditional export prom otion has
cost the country its sovereignty. For
example, in 1988 an advisor to the
Arias governm ent accused the US
o f setting up a “parallel state” in
Costa Rica consisting o f several
nongovernm ent agencies funded
by the US Agency for International
D evelopm ent (AID). These AIDfunded, nongovernm ent agencies

perform essentially the same func
tions as those perform ed by Costa
Rican governm ent agencies.

NONTRADITIONAL EXPORTS
OUTSIDE OF CENTRAL AMERICA
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Centro de Prom ocidn de
Exportaciones e Inversiones (CENPRO)

For instance, AID founded the
Coalition Costarricense de Iniciativas
para elDesarrollo (CINDE) in 1982
to pursue the same objectives as
the Costa Rican governm ent’s
Centro de Promotion de Exportationes
e Inversiones (CENPRO). After years
o f tu rf battles, the better-financed
CINDE now carries out m ost o f the
functions that were perform ed by
CENPRO. Unlike CENPRO, how
ever, CINDE is n eith er part o f the
Costa Rican governm ent n o r ac
countable to the Costa Rican pub
lic. It appears that CINDE has been
m ore successful in attracting for
eign export-oriented investm ent to
Costa Rica than CENPRO ever was.
Given the superiority o f its AIDbacked funding, technical exper
tise, and determ ination, CINDE
has em barrassed CENPRO’s de
fenders. But CINDE’s success is

based on m acroeconom ic policies,
principally currency devaluation
and m arket deregulation, th at have
been orchestrated by the US gov
ernm ent, the International M one
tary Fund, and the W orld Bank. In
the context o f intensifying world
wide com petition for, and spatial
relocation of, nontraditional ex
p o rt firms—including the form a
tion o f regional trade blocs—does
Costa Rica’s current success in
attracting such investm ent from
abroad prom ise to foster local de
velopment?
A lthough agriculture and sea
food are steady contributors to
nontraditional exports, the most
dram atic growth has occurred in
light m anufacturing and, m ore re
cently, tourism , the focal points of
CINDE’s efforts. Most of the em 
ploym ent created by these in
dustries is low wage and low skill.
A ccording to proponents, however,
such em ploym ent benefits Costa
Rica because it increases family
incom e by absorbing “supplem en
tary” earners— primarily wom en—
in the case of the urban-based
garm ent industry, or provides jobs
to regional pockets o f high u nem 
ployment, as tourism does.
W hatever the role of such em 
ploym ent may be in local labor
m arkets and household econo
mies, there rem ains a larger, u n 
answered question: toward what
pattern o f national developm ent
do these jobs contribute? Thus, will
Costa Rica progress from offering
itself as a light-assembly export
platform to building relatively so
phisticated, vertically integrated
dom estic industries? O r will it con
tinue to com pete with o th er lessdeveloped countries for foreign
investors seeking low-cost produc
tion sites with privileged access to
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the US market? T he specter o f a
possible N orth American free-trade
agreem ent, which could undercut
Costa Rica’s cu rrent attractiveness
to foreign investors, makes the export-platform option increasingly
risky.
C om pared with tourism and
light m anufacturing, nontradi
tional agricultural exports gener
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ally contribute m ore value-added
to the local economy. T he leading
firms in the nontraditional agricul
tural sector, however, are foreign,
no t domestic. Superior access to
m arket inform ation, transporta
tion, technological expertise, and
credit favor relatively large foreign
firms. Since only a small portion of
production in the leading nontradi

tional agricultural export indus
tries is purchased from national
growers, small-farmer participation
in the new export prom otion
scheme is quite limited. W here
it does exist, small farm ers are
plagued by problem s such as plant
diseases, poor technical assistance,
lack o f knowledge o f m arket con
ditions, inadequate credit, and a
weak bargaining position with
exporters.
Large and small growers make
intensive use o f pesticides in culti
vating the new export crops be
cause achieving the flawless
appearance crucial to their suc
cessful m arketing creates extra
headaches in tropical climates. Yet
the excessive use o f pesticides
threatens the sustainability o f ex
p o rt prom otion in two ways. First,
evidence indicates th at large
am ounts o f pesticide residue left
on produce jeopardize entry into
the US, the principal m arket for
nontraditional agricultural p ro d 
ucts. To make m atters worse, esca
lating cycles o f increasing pest
resistance and stepped-up pesticide
application may reach the point in
the near future where production
must be abandoned altogether.
T he fact that the Dom inican Re
public reached this point with sev
eral nontraditional crops by the
late 1980s should serve as a warn
ing for C entral America.
Second, fragm entary evidence
indicates frightening consequences
for hum an populations and the nat
ural environm ent. Growers from
Costa Rica and o th er C entral Amer
ican countries rep o rt symptoms of
pesticide illness as well as bird and
fish kills stem m ing from contam i
nated fresh water sources. They
also rep o rt the destruction of for
est areas as a result o f the opening
o f new export-production sites.
T here is no telling what the longerterm im pact may be on anim al pop
ulations, soil, and gro u n d water.

Challenges
A few years o f spectacular export
figures are no t worth the long-

range degradation o f Costa Rica’s
natural resources. With a decade of
experience, critics and proponents
alike recognize the pitfalls o f the
cu rren t schem e o f nontraditional
export prom otion. The time is ripe
to push the new export m odel to
ward m ore equitable and sustain
able developm ent.
Costa Rica may find greater sta
bility by intensifying the current
m ovem ent toward trade diversifica
tion, in term s o f both finding new
m arkets for nontraditional exports
and renewing efforts to establish re
gional trade agreem ents. Export in
centives should be reduced and
used selectively to target the types
o f industries and jobs that offer
Costa Rica higher wages, m ore sta
ble em ploym ent, and technological
transfers. Lastly, environm ental
protection is crucial no t only if
high-value agricultural products
are to becom e p erm an en t export
com m odities, b u t also for the
health o f growers and the con
servation o f flora and fauna.
Such policy reform requires two
things: increased governm ent ad
ministrative capacity and a political
coalition dem anding and support
ing such changes. Im proved m ana
gerial capacity is com patible with a
smaller b u t m ore efficient state. In
an age of austerity, the problem
will be locating the resources to
train and pay m ore sophisticated
state adm inistrators. The second re
qu irem en t is that political parties,
above all, the Partido Liberation
National, pull away from their cur
ren t preoccupation with the de
m ands o f exporters, the financial
sector, and the international bank
ing and aid com m unity to incor
porate peasants and the urban
working and m iddle classes into
political coalitions unified by a
broad vision o f sustainable devel
opm ent. Any support for such
coalitions faces the form idable
obstacles posed by the fragility of
Costa Rica’s econom ic situation
and its need for m ajor injections
o f capital from foreign investors
and international financial institu
tions. ■
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GATT: The Right to Life Forms
by Paula L. Green

om e o f the w orld’s biggest
com panies are waging a
little-publicized, high
stakes war over the patent
rights to plants, animals,
and o th er life forms. Ac
cording to the experts, the contest
could ultim ately yield billions of
dollars in royalties for patent hold
ers from the sale o f new m edicines,
crop varieties, or even breeds of
animals developed from the initial
patents. T he com panies, and their
huge product developm ent budg
ets, are pitted against developing
nations that claim that the corpora
tions are stealing their natural re
sources to fuel the developm ent
process.
Backed by their governments,
m ultinationals like M onsanto are
pressing th eir case in Geneva,
where the 103 signatories to the
G eneral A greem ent on Tariffs and
T rade (GATT) have been strug
gling for m ore than five years to
write new rules for world trade in
goods and services. According to
M onsanto’s William Duffey—
general paten t counsel for the St.
Louis-based chemical giant—pat
ents are “need ed to give incentives
to researchers to take risks . . . , to
try and develop pharm aceuticals
and agro-chemicals. If th e re ’s no
p aten t protection for discovery,
com panies like ours are not going
to invest that kind o f m oney for
new m edicines and new agro
chem icals.”
C onfronting them , however,
are the developing nations that ac
cuse the m ultinationals o f stealing
T hird W orld plants and crop varie-

Paula L. Green is a reporter covering
international trade and business for the
Jo u rn al of Com merce.
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ties along with the knowledge re
quired to use them . As if that were
n o t enough, these nations con
tend, the m ultinationals later re
turn the supposedly pilfered goods
to the developing countries— pre
viously p atented and now sporting
a huge price tag. W alter Reid, se
nior associate at the W orld Re
sources Institute in W ashington,
DC, sum m ed up the conflict this
way: “T he developing countries say
the N orth is patenting genes devel
oped by farm ers in the South . . . ,
and then the patented crop varie
ties are being sold back to the

Developing nations
accuse the
multinationals of
stealing Third World
plants and crop
varieties along with
the knowledge
required to use them.
farm ers in the South. They (West
ern com panies) are getting the
genes free o f charge and selling
the patented products back to the
farm er. . . . T h at’s the political de
bate.” According to agro-economist
Pat Mooney, policy coordinator for
C anada’s Rural A dvancem ent Foun
dation International, “T he fear is
that those who have the knowledge
and legal m eans will canvass and
ransack the forests of the Third
W orld and claim rights to whatever
they see.”

A perfect illustration o f T hird
World fears is the case o f US pat
en t No. 559. This paten t gives its
holder all rights to a rare variety of
flower found in the distant rain for
ests o f Guatemala. A US citizen ob
tained the patent in the 1940s after
stum bling across the unique strain
while vacationing there. According
to Mooney, “He selected the best
of the seeds, destroyed the rest and
took out a p aten t on the variety,”
which is now known as “Black
P rince.”
T he current Uruguay R ound of
GATT talks is the first to address
the protection of intellectual p ro p 
erty. Such property includes pat
ents and tradem arks as well as
copyrights on everything from
com puter software to films to video
recorders. With the general nego
tiations bogged down in a bitter
controversy over agricultural sub
sidies, no one interviewed for this
report was willing to predict the
final result o f the associated Ge
neva talks on the protection o f in
tellectual property. “T he outcom e
o f the talks depends on what hap
pens on o th er areas of negotia
tions,” said Abdulgawi Yusuf, legal
policy director for the UN Con
ference on Trade and Develop
m ent (UNCTAD). “T he issue of
patents will be the last issue to be
decided. It requires political deci
sions.”
The rifts at the GATT negotiat
ing table extend beyond the tradi
tional North-South divisions. While
the US and Japan advocate patent
ing all life forms, up to but n o t in
cluding hum ans, the EC takes a
m ore pragm atic view. Karl Falkenberg, a counselor in the EC delega
tion to GATT, said the com m unity
has no stated negotiating position
on the issue but will “wait to see

mercial use, the original invest
m ent would never be recovered.”
He concluded by stating that the
UK p aren t com pany—which he
says is not involved in anim al re
search— favors the patenting of life
forms up to the level of plants.
Many nations, however, want to
exclude the patenting o f life forms
from the negotiations simply be
cause the inform ation is so new.
“T he im plications o f the technolog
ical advances are too uncertain. We
want to see how the new biotech
nology may evolve,” said A ntonio
Trom betta, A rgentina’s negotiator
on intellectual property rights. “It’s
too early a stage to have an interna
tional agreem ent. It would be diffi
cult to change.”
C ultural Survival, a hum anrights organization for indigenous
people, does no t believe interna
tional trade talks and treaties are
the best ways to preserve either the
life forms or the knowledge of de
veloping nations and their native
com m unities. “My attention is on

w hat’s in it for us.” Mooney ob
served that the EC delegation has
resisted the patenting o f any life
forms above the level o f a plant.
Some W estern corporations in
sist that “inventions” based on life
forms such as m icroorganism s
need paten t protection because
their reproduction is tougher to
control. London-based Im perial
Chem ical Industries PLC, through
its ICI seed division, takes that posi
tion. According to Tim Roberts,
who is intellectual property m an
ager for ICI, an industrial inven
tion m ust be designed and built
before it can be reproduced, bu t a
living organism can reproduce it
self once it is released. He stressed
that com panies need protection
for costly biotechnological develop
m ents th at could improve the en 
vironm ent—developm ents like
m icroorganism s that can clean up
hazardous wastes or a new type of
potato plant that produces twice,
the norm al yield. As Roberts put it,
“Unless th ere’s protection for com 

getting the com pany to do it right,”
said Jason Clay, director o f re
search for C ultural Survival, which
is based in Cam bridge, Massachu
setts. “I’m suspicious o f conven
tions and treaties.”
According to Abdulgawi Yusuf
of the aforem entioned UNCTAD,
developing nations should be work
ing to protect intellectual property
rights to their plants, animals, and
genetic resources before the sub
stances are taken ou t of the coun
tries by W estern com panies and
governm ent agencies. "Many times,
one hand d oesn’t know what the
o ther is doing. T he awareness has
not really reached the policymak
ing stage. T he only thing (devel
oping nations) can do for now is
resist as m uch as they can the pat
enting o f genetic resources.” ■

Editor’s Note: Adapted with permission
from //^'Journal o f C om m erce (De
cember 16, 1991).
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Bachata: From Raw to Rosy
by Deborah Pacini Hernandez

ith m ore than 3.5
m illion album s sold
and six hit singles
since its 1990 re
lease, Bachata Rosa,
by the Dom inican
R epublic’s Ju an Luis G uerra and
4.40, is the m ost commercially
successful recording in the recent
history o f Latin Am erican music. In
1992, when m ajor US rock perform 
ers had to cancel dates o r reduce
prices because o f faltering ticket
sales, 4.40 com m anded $35 a ticket
in solidly booked appearances
th ro u g h o u t th eir US tour. Given
that the venues were in the US,
such success was a first for a Latin
Am erican band, but no t the last for
4.40. After skyrocketing onto the
Billboard charts, their popularity
was n o ted by the likes o f the New
York Times, Rolling Stone, the Village
Voice, and even the Wall StreetJour
nal, b u t despite the volume o f ac
claim, very little attention has been
paid to the history and nature of
the bachata g enre that inspired sev
eral o f the songs in Bachata Rosa.

Origins
T he Diccionario de la Lengua Espanola defines “bachata'’ as a spon
taneous and inform al backyard
get-together. In rural areas o f the
D om inican Republic, bachatas in
clude plenty o f food and drink and
are enlivened by either guitar or
accordion-based music, but it was

Deborah Pacini Hernandez is assistant
director of the Centerfor Latin Ameri
can Studies at the University of Florida.
Her publications include “Cantando la
cama vacia: Love, Sex and Gender Re
lationships in Dominican bachata, ”
Popular Music (1990).
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Backyard Bachata

no t until the 1970s that the term
bachata came to include guitarbased music. Only then did it jo in
the ranks o f Dom inican and o ther
Hispanic-Caribbean genres such as
bolero, son, guaracha, guajira, corrido,
and ranchera.
While guitar-based ensembles
had long been the preferred music
in the Dom inican R epublic’s rural
areas, beginning in the 1930s the
accordion-based merengue was sin
gled out and favored by the dic
tator Rafael Trujillo, who in the
1940s and 1950s personally began
to encourage—by patronizing topnotch orquestas (or big bands)—
new, sophisticated versions o f the
rural merengue that were m eant for
the urban salon. C om pared to
these large cosm opolitan ensem 
bles, rural guitar trios appeared
rustic and provincial. Thus, while
guitar-based music continued to be
played by folk musicians at bachatas
and o th er social gatherings, few if
any recording opportunities were

available to these self-taught rural
musicians.
T he post-Trujillo era witnessed
profound dem ographic and social
changes. W hen Trujillo died in
1961, 70% o f the Dom inican Re
public’s 3 m illion people lived in
rural areas. With the fall o f the die
tatorship, rural m igrants began to
p o u r into the capital city o f Santo
Domingo, and they took their
preference for guitar-based music
with them . T hough Santo Dom in
go was soon ringed by shantytowns
filled with the unem ployed and
desperately poor, guitar-based
music—so closely associated with
the rural and urban p o o r—was un
able to challenge merengue's hege
mony. Nevertheless, opportunities
did open up for guitar music, if
only on a small scale. Small, inde
p en d e n t recording studios and
producers provided new o p p o rtu 
nities for poor and inexperienced
Dom inican musicians to record,
while, at the same time, small local

radio stadons catered to a widen
ing variety o f tastes. Rural musi
cians who were unable to record or
prom ote their music during the
Trujillo era began to finance their
own records and to seek radio play
wherever they could find it. The
first to do so were Jose Manuel
Calderon, Luis Segura, and Oscar
Olmos. T heir ensembles, whose in
strum entation has changed little to
this day, consisted o f two guitars,
bongos, and maracas.
These early pressings were
poorly recorded, produced, and
m anufactured. Still, they found im
m ediate acceptance in the country
side and urban shantytowns, where
people with rural origins contin
ued to prefer guitar-based music.
Most o f the music produced was of
the bolero genre, although o th er guitar-based genres were recorded as
well. T he rom antic song texts, com 
posed by people with little if any
formal education, were usually
written in a rath er rustic and u n 
ad orned style, little resem bling the
florid Cuban boleros that they were
imitating.
The decade of the 1960s, then,
was the formative period for the
bachata, when its distinctive fea
tures were established: the basic
guitar-centered ensem ble with its
unpolished singing style, collo
quial language and imagery, and a
preoccupation with relationships
between m en and women. This
guitar-based music—so clearly
gro u n d ed in the customs and
problem s o f the poor—becam e
the object o f increasing criticism
and disparagem ent. Bachata was
unfavorably com pared with salsa,
orquesta merengue, and balada, as
well as US rock, which together
dom inated the m ainstream Do
m inican music scene.
D uring the 1970s, as the Dom in
ican R epublic’s econom ic and so
cial fortunes seem ed to be on the
rise, the m iddle and u p p er classes
regarded the rustic guitar-based
music as incom patible with the
country’s newly acquired m odern
self-image. For the first time the
music was labeled “bachata,” a word

that acquired the negative conno
tation o f rural backwardness and
vulgarity. Bachata was shunned by
m ajor radio stations in urban areas,
and record stores in urban, middleclass areas refused to sell it.

“I have a little car
that’s a delight
I f I ’m with a woman
it goesfaster
I keep my car in the
carport
But I take it outfor my
female neighbor
Come here, neighbor,
and don’t be afraid
I ’m going to take the
car out to give you
a ride”
— Excerpted from “ElCarrito”
by Tony Santos (1985)

While bachata was denied access
to prom otion and distribution
through the channels available to
o th er forms o f popular music, its
popularity am ong the rural and
urban poor expanded throughout
the 1970s. Sold in markets and bus
stops all over the country, the 45rpm disks filled the shelves in
m akeshift street stalls owned and
operated by people belonging to
the same low socioeconom ic class
as bachata musicians and their au
dience. Nonetheless, the m ajor
m eans o f dissem ination was, and
still is, the colmado, or neighbor
hood store, whose owners m ain
tained their record collections
up-to-date in ord er to please the
custom ers and to encourage them
to linger, socialize, and, o f course,
buy m ore beverages. Moreover,

while neighborhood barras, o r bars,
were sometimes associated with
prostitution, they were the only
public spaces available to residents
o f poor neighborhoods for music,
dancing, and drinking. T he music
m ost often played at barras and colmados was bachata, which, unlike
the o th er popular genres, was sel
dom if ever heard on m ajor radio
o r television stations.

Raw Bachata
By 1980 bachata reflected the na
tio n ’s worsening econom ic condi
tion. Extended rom antic courtship
and a lifetime o f m arriage were no
longer valid ideals in these urban
shantytowns, where unions tended
to be short-lived and dictated by
money. T he lyrics o f bachata cor
respondingly becam e m ore sexu
ally explicit, reflecting the crude
shantytown realities o f barroom
brawls, lack o f m oney to provide
for a stable relationship, and tran
sient affairs. W here boleros had ex
pressed exalted feelings o f eternal
love, bachata lyrics m ore frequently
expressed simply the desire for im
m ediate sexual gratification. M ean
while, tourists, visiting Dom inican
expatriates, and highly sophis
ticated Dom inican TV with its
seven color stations and US satel
lite broadcasts, flaunted a lifestyle
that was unattainable to the poor.
In the 1980s a variant o f the sex
ually explicit song, the dobk sentido
(double m eaning), was popular
ized by a younger generation o f
singers such as Tony Santos, Julio
Angel, “El Solterito del Sur,” and Bias
Duran. In these songs, objects of
daily life—vehicles, food, utensils—
becam e m etaphors for body parts
and functions. T he verbal play,
relying on the contrast between
m undane objects and explicit sex
uality, was considered extrem ely hu
m orous by the bachata audience; it
was shocking, however, to m ain
stream Dom inican society and be
came the target o f severe criticism.
The term "bachata," which in the
previous decade simply im plied
rural backwardness and ignorance,
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came to suggest an o th er set of so
cially unacceptable features that
were attributed to the “underclass,”
including illicit sex, violence, and
heavy drinking.
To their credit, the musicians
who still played the m ore rom antic
variety o f bachata resisted these dis
paraging associations. A round
1982 they began publicizing per
form ances as fiestas de amargue (bit
terness). T he music becam e musica
de amargue. a reference to the feel
ing o f nostalgia and suffering that
characterized their music. This was
a deliberate attem pt to confer so
cial prestige upon the musician
and the audience by distinguishing
the merely em bittered songs from
the “vulgar” ones, thereby associ
ating the m ore rom antic variety
with social respectability. For ex
ample, one new spaper rep o rter as
serted, "Amargue denotes sorrow
and sadness, bachata carousing and
vulgarity” (Hoy, August 25, 1983).
It is h ard to say w hether it was
the new nam e, the appeal o f the
sexually explicit lyrics, o r o ther
socioeconom ic factors that were
responsible for a brief surge of
widespread interest in bachata, but
for a short period it becam e fash
ionable listening for the Dom in
ican m iddle classes. The better
known perform ers such as Luis
Segura began playing in elegant
hotels and nightclubs for standingroom-only crowds. This intrusion
into m ainstream society did not
occur, however, w ithout resistance
and controversy. A concert held in
1983 at the national university in
Santo Dom ingo was severely criti
cized by the university’s dean as
being unworthy of presentation at
a public institution. T he polem ic
that followed the concert and the
d ea n ’s com m ents revealed deep
class and regional divisions in
Dom inican society. T he boom de
amargue, as it was called, was short
lived, though, and by 1985 the
music was again relegated to its
form er underclass contexts and to
its inferior and virtually invisible
status in m ainstream Dom inican
society.
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Rom antic bachatas continued to
be produced, though most of these
songs expressed a specific subset of
em otions related to love, such as
despair, indignation, and the suf
fering caused by deception and be
trayal. Trouble was almost always
attributed to an unfaithful woman,
but one can discern that these
songs also implicitly expressed the
breakdown of traditional family
structure, frustration at lack o f life
choices, and an increased percep
tion o f drinking and violence as
valid responses to these personal
and social crises. Bachata, unlike
the sophisticated, internationally
successful merengue, did not reflect
a glitzy middle-class lifestyle unat
tainable to the bachata audience.

Bachateros adapted
the stereotype and
flaunted it with
total disregardfor
the disapproval
of mainstrea m
Dominican society.
T he world reflected in bachata was
neither an aspiration n o r a fantasy,
but a reality considered vulgar and
uncouth by m ainstream society. Ba
chateros adopted the stereotype and
flaunted it with total disregard for
the disapproval o f m ainstream Do
m inican society: the very directness
o f bachata songs posed a deliberate
challenge to the values of a society
that consistently excluded bachata's
practitioners and audience.

Rosy Bachata
E nter Ju an Luis G uerra and 4.40.
T heir extraordinary success has put
the previously despised bachata on
the international music map. How
close are the recording’s key songs
to the grassroots bachatas upon
which they are based? First, there is

a fundam ental difference between
the stark simplicity o f street bachata
and G uerra’s elegant, sophisticated
version. T he latter can be catego
rized as bachatas only because they
are rendered with the typical ba
chata instrum entation of guitar,
maracas, and bongos, and are sung
in an em otional, plaintive m anner.
In the case of “Burbujas de amor,”
the similarity extends to the use of
sexual double m eaning in the lyr
ics. T he crude shantytown reali
ties— so clearly reflected in the
grassroots bachata—are absent.
G uerra is not alone, however, in
drawing upon bachata for artistic in
spiration. In fact, the “dressed u p ”
bachatas that have em erged in the
wake of G uerra’s success are re
ferred to in the Dom inican Re
public as tecnobachatas. Because
they have transform ed it into
som ething exotic and palatable
for the middle-class audiences that
scorned it, these musicians m ight
be criticized for exploiting the ba
chata. Still, in G uerra’s case at least,
he has drawn upon the genre in
m uch the same way he has drawn
upon o th er Dom inican folk genres
in the past—with respect and integ
rity. It is also significant th at he
chose the word “bachata'' instead of
the m ore polite term "amargue,”
thereby expressing solidarity with
the music in its m ore socially un
acceptable form.
G uerra’s adm irers should
bear in m ind, however, that his
bachatas—com posed by a sophis
ticated and economically com 
fortable urban intellectual— are
interpretations o f a local genre firmly
rooted in the social realities. Ideal
ly his com m ercial windfall will
trickle down to bachata musicians—
who themselves have never enjoyed
even a glim m er o f his success— in
the form of a p erm anen t cultural
legitimacy within the Dom inican
Republic. Even better, perhaps Do
m inicans and o ther fans o f Latin
American music will seek o u t re
cordings by street-level bachateros so
that they can hear and support ba
chata as it was, and is, m ade—by
people on the m argins o f society. ■
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Manley’s Legacy
by Anthony Payne

ew political leaders in
Latin America and the
C aribbean return to of
fice a second time, and
fewer still by reelection
after a previous defeat.
O ne of the notable exceptions was
Jam aica’s Michael Manley and his
P eople’s National Party (PNP). In
February 1989— m ore than eight
years after Prim e M inister Manley
and the PNP were soundly rejected
by voters for failing to build dem o
cratic socialism in Jam aica—Man
ley was again in office as prim e
minister.
T he Michael Manley o f 1989
was, to all appearances, a very
different figure from the radical
firebrand o f a few years earlier.
T he international m edia quickly
d u bbed him the “new” Manley.
They n o ted that he now wore busi
ness suits rath er than the opennecked karebas fashionable in
Jam aican governm ental circles in
the 1970s, that he spoke warmly
about future close relations with
the US than as opposed to Cuba,
and that he appeared to have es
chewed the language o f socialism
for that o f political m oderation
and free-m arket economics.
But was there really a “new”
Manley? It is an appropriate time
to ask this question, for at the end
o f M arch 1992, Manley resigned as
prim e m inister and left Jam aican
politics after 40 years o f active and
always controversial involvement.
Since his new governm ent had
been in office for m ore than three
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years at that point, we can indeed
evaluate the m erits o f the “new
M anley” thesis. The key issue is not
so m uch M anley’s altered political
style—which may simply have re
flected tactical judgm ents— or even
his core ideological beliefs (which
may have changed less than has
been generally assum ed), bu t rath
er his actual m anagem ent o f the Ja
m aican political econom y from

Manley’s new
approach developed
haltingly, with Manley
perhaps having been
rather more dragged
along by events than
cotifidently charting a
new course.
February 1989 onward. H ere, at
least, there is unequivocal evidence
o f a new Manley at work. His new
approach did no t manifest itself im
m ediately on reelection, but devel
oped haltingly, with Manley and
his governm ent perhaps having
been rather m ore dragged along
by events than confidently charting
a novel course for the Jam aican po
litical economy. Nevertheless, in as
sessing the changing character of
Latin Am erican and Caribbean de
velopm ent in the 1990s, the cum u
lative result was significant.

The Evolution
Manley’s 1989 governm ent evolved
through four stages. T he first was

one o f “m uddling th ro u g h ” on the
basis o f a structural adjustm ent pro
gram inherited from the outgoing
Edward Seaga adm inistration. Com
pletely reversing the psychology of
the 1970s, when the politics of
change was his dom inant ethic,
Manley announced that he would
n o t “agree to changing anything in
the m anagem ent of the econom y”
unless he was “absolutely sure that
change is going to help and make
things better in some way.”
With the public-sector deficit in
flated by the costs o f rebuilding
after H urricane Gilbert in 1988
and the burst o f spending with
which Seaga had tried to win the
election, the Manley governm ent
h ad virtually no scope to introduce
its mildly social-democratic pro
gram. T hough it reached agree
m ent with the International
M onetary Fund (IMF) on a $66
m illion standby program , the gov
ern m en t was unable to hold the
econom y to the IMF targets, lead
ing the adm inistration to formally
devalue the currency in O ctober
1989. T he failure to m eet IMF tar
gets also led to the suspension of
the standby agreem ent and the in
auguration o f the second stage of
the new Manley adm inistration.
While a new deal with the IMF
was quickly made, it alm ost im me
diately ran into trouble. Manley
publicly argued that the breaches
that occurred were technical,
caused by the delay o f bilateral do
nors m aking prom ised payments.
The IMF, on the o th er hand, in
sisted that the Jam aican govern
m ent had no t gone far enough
towards retren ch m en t and th at a
fu rth er devaluation was needed.
Yet, tension did no t reach the
heights o f the Manley-IMF conflict
o f the late 1970s, and the political

m ood in the country rem ained
quiet. T he PNP did reasonably well
in local elections in M arch 1990
and the an n o u n cem ent o f sub
stantial fuel price rises in April of
that year did n o t generate distur
bances. Manley him self was ou t of
the country for m uch o f the sum
m er of 1990, undergoing m ajor sur
gery, with P. J. Patterson serving as
acting prim e minister.
Indeed, it fell to Patterson to
launch the change o f direction
that initiated the next, and per
haps m ost im portant, stage in the
PNP governm ent m anagem ent of
the economy. In a surprise move in
Septem ber 1990, the governm ent
floated the Jam aican dollar. Al
though the adm inistration m ain
tained foreign-exchange controls,
the new policy allowed commercial
banks to buy and sell hard cur
rency, with an average w eighted
rate being calculated from those
rates operating in the commercial
sector. Petroleum and diesel
prices, meanwhile, were also de
regulated.
Patterson and later Manley
an n o u n ced that these were not
m easures of expediency, but rather
the latest in a long line of govern
m ent m aneuvers by which Manley
tu rn ed his back on the protected
and regulated Jam aican economy
o f the past and em braced the new
world o f deregulation and liber
alization. As he declared, “now that
we are em barked on the course, I,
for one, am excited by the chal
lenge.”
D eregulation was part o f Ja
m aica’s continuing dialogue with
the IMF. T he previous agreem ent
was in effect reinstated and later
replaced with a new standby deal.
Nevertheless, the Manley govern
m en t rem ained hard-pressed by foreign-exchange shortages and in its
1991 budget again had to increase
taxes and cut subsidies, this time
with m ore severe consequences
for its popularity.
T he renewal of IMF support
prefaced the fourth phase o f the
Manley adm inistration. In Sep
tem ber 1991 the adm inistration

deepened its com m itm ent to de
regulation by lifting all foreignexchange controls. Manley told
Jam aicans this action was necessary
to kill off the black m arket in for
eign exchange, implying that the
currency had to be left to find its
true m arket value. As the value of
Jam aica’s currency relative to the
US dollar fell by 36% in Septem berNovember 1991, prices continued
to rise steeply. In light o f these dif
ficulties, Manley’s governm ent

The government’s
neoliberal strategy has
been one enormous
gamble bom of an
inability to think of
any other viable
alternative in the
context of the global
ascendancy of

,

sank rapidly in the polls. To many
observers it looked as if M anley’s
governm ent could be the first oneterm governm ent in the history of
Jam aican two-party politics. Manley
publicly acknowledged that his poli
cies were causing hardship b u t re
peatedly stated that they were
irreversible. T he currency’s value
continued to slide, falling by an
other 16% on the third anniversary
of the governm ent’s election, and
how far it m ight fall was anybody’s
guess.
Indeed, the governm ent’s strat
egy has been one enorm ous gam 
ble, born o f an inability to think of
any o th er viable alternative in the
context o f the global ascendancy of
neoliberalism . Manley came reluc
tantly and slowly to this view before

fully com m itting his governm ent to
deregulation. As a consequence,
he left his adm inistration little time
for the benefits o f neoliberal policy
to em erge.

After Manley
This was the political context of
Manley’s M arch 1992 resignation.
Given his ill health, speculation
had long existed that his retire
m ent from politics was im m inent,
with Patterson being the obvious
successor. N onetheless, in a shock
ing move at the end o f 1991, Patter
son left the governm ent following
a heated debate over cabinet p ro 
cedure. H e was u n d er pressure
because o f his role in a scandal
involving the waiver o f duties to
the local Shell Company. A ddition
ally he wanted to be free to cam
paign for the post to be vacated by
Prim e M inister Manley. T hough he
was replaced as m inister o f finance,
it was significant that he retained
his position as PNP’s chairm an.
Although Patterson was re
garded as less popular am ong party
activists than Portia Simpson, the
only m em ber o f the cabinet to
challenge him for the leadership
after Manley resigned, Patterson in
fact won the electoral contest by a
large margin. Thus he has taken
over responsibility for the govern
m en t’s new neoliberal econom ic
strategy at a time when there is
already less than two years to go
before the latest m om ent—Febru
ary 1994— when the next election
can be called.
T here is actually little th at Patter
son can do to influence the elec
tio n ’s results. In effect, what the
“new” Manley governm ent did was
to ask the Jam aican people to suf
fer severely in ord er to create the
basis for an export platform capa
ble of at last propelling the econ
omy into self-sustaining growth.
Local and foreign businesses have
greater incentives to invest in Ja
maica today than ever before. The
success or failure o f the new strat
egy now depends on how they re
spond. ■
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

Article 27— Watch Out
In one of his m ost far-reaching re
forms to date, Mexican president
Carlos Salinas de Gortari am ended
Article 27 of the constitution, there
by giving com m unal farm ers the
right to m ortgage, rent, or sell
their land. Reports indicate that
the new law could affect half the
acreage in the country and as
m uch as 30% o f the population.
Despite the rep o rted surge in inter
est on the part of foreign investors
in this newly available real estate,
some analysts worry that m uch of
the rural population will be forced
off the land. T he consequences of
the revised Article 27 could be
fu rth er com plicated by the N orth
Am erican Free T rade Agreem ent.
Mexican negotiators have been re
luctant to open the country to u n 
lim ited corn and bean imports.
T he com bination of rural reform s
coupled with a gradual opening of
this formerly protected m arket
could result in the large-scale dis
location o f rural workers, driving
them into urban areas on both
sides o f the US-Mexican border.

Exceptions to the US Embargo
of Haiti
Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.—
a Miami-based firm specializing in
international trade law—pulls no
punches in its April 15, 1992, Trade
and Industry Report newsletter. In an
article on exceptions to the US
trade em bargo against Haiti, the
firm notes th at the US D epartm ent

Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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o f Treasury—specifically its Office
o f Foreign Assets C ontrol (FAC)—
issued G eneral License No. 8 on
February 5, 1992. T he G eneral Li
cense allows, on a case-by-case
basis, specific licenses to be issued
authorizing certain US-Haiti ex
ports and imports. According to
the newsletter, the “FAC, generally
a sleepy office hidden in the annex
Treasury D epartm ent building, has
been overwhelmed with applica
tions for specific licenses.”

Worth Seeing
The Am erican Federation o f Arts
has organized an international
to u r o f short films from Latin
America. D irected byjulianne
B urton o f the University o f Califor
nia at Santa Cruz, the exhibition
presents 36 works from 12 coun
tries and encompasses fictional
subjects, docum entaries, and ani
mations. T he offerings have been
organized into six program s: “The
L and,” “People at W ork,” “C hange
and Conflict,” “M asculine/Fem i
n in e,” “H eroes and H ealers,” and
“Creativity and Expression.” The
fall 1992 tour will include Miami
(August 16-September 20), Los An
geles (Septem ber 28-November 9),
Columbia, Missouri (O ctober 2Novem ber 6), M adrid (Novem ber
21-28), and Newport Beach, Cali
fornia (D ecem ber 18-February 14,
1993).

At Least He’s Consistent
U nfortunately for Guatemala,
Christian D em ocrat Vinicio Cerezo’s presidency (1985-90) was

m arked by corruption and mis
m anagem ent. Cerezo him self dis
appointed many with his desultory
personal and political style. It was
no surprise then, that despite
am ple prior notice, the form er
president expressed his regrets at
being unable to attend this year’s
conference observing the fifth anni
versary o f the Esquipulas II Peace
Accords. Instead, Cerezo sent a
thoughtful statem ent on the his
toric peace treaty in a lengthy
telefax to conference officials.
T he recipients were startled, not
by the docum ent itself, but by the
point o f origin stam ped at the top
o f each page: H otel Fantasy Island.
T he hotel is located in the Bay Is
lands of the C aribbean, where
Cerezo was enjoying a cruise in
his yacht.

No Lo Contendere
A H udson Institute briefing paper
on opportunities in Latin America
provides a predictable outline of
the region’s changing business en
vironm ent. O n Cuba, the docu
m ent predicts some instability once
Castro falls in the 1990s. According
to the analysis, “T he role o f the
exile com m unity will be a difficult
factor if exile groups seek political
power, as many apparently will,
and Cubans on the island regard
them as foreigners. Regime propa
ganda has portrayed the exiles as
m illionaires planning to buy the
island and recreate a Batista-style
society, and only time will tell how
deeply those arguments have sunk in. ”
T he author? N one o th er than for
m er Reagan adm inistration assis
tant secretary for inter-American
affairs, Elliott Abrams.

Fools and Follies
G lenn Garvin, who was the Washing
ton Times' re p o rter in N icaragua in
1983-89, has published Everybody
Had His Own Gringo: The CIA &
the Contras (New York: Brassey’s,
1992). T he pithy forward to the
long-awaited book sets the tone for
Garvin’s hard-charging style. Writ
ten by analyst P. J. O ’Rourke, the
forward lauds the author for indulg
ing in “no heavy breathing over
Iranian arms deals.” O ’Rourke fur
th er states th at “Garvin shows us
contra political leaders whose van
ity and quarrelsom eness turned
contra governance into som ething
like an International Convention
o f First Wives,” and that “Garvin
puts all the fools and their follies
into perspective.”

World Bank Environment
Roundup
T he W orld B ank’s Patrick Low is
the editor o f “International Trade
and the E nvironm ent,” a series of
research papers p repared by lead
ing environm entalists and trade
specialists from academ ia and the
W orld Bank. Topics o f the 18 pa
pers range from “T rade Policy and
P ollution” to “Tropical Forests and
T rade Policy: T he Case o f Indone
sia and Brazil.” They are available
in the World Bank Discussion Papers,
no. 159 (April 1992).

AT&T Phone Home
While some may be disturbed by
the attem pted coup in Venezuela
on February 4, 1992, AT&T board

vice chairm an Randall L. Tobias
rem ains upbeat. Speaking before a
crowded G reater Miami C ham ber
o f C om m erce m eeting ju st days
after the incident, he assured his
business audience that “we are not
discouraged from investing in the
region because o f this single
event.” No w onder. As Tobias
pointed ou t later in his address,
AT&T’s Latin Am erican product
sales soared from $6 m illion in
1989 to $150 m illion in 1991:
a growth rate o f 250%.

Backyard Low Politics
Now that there is no m ore Soviet
threat in C entral America and a
peace treaty has been signed in El
Salvador, the US can focus on is
sues that were neglected during
the ideological struggles o f the
1980s. Evidence o f this is the fact
that the US trade representative
placed El Salvador in the Annual
Report on Major Trade Barriers to
United States Exports (1991). El
Salvador was cited because o f its
willingness to condone the piracy
o f works copyrighted in the US.
T he citation subjects El Salvador to
possible retaliation against its ex
ports to the US.

What Did He Say?
President G eorge Bush has often
been accused o f “bushism s,” or
speaking a language that only he
understands. For example, at the
Dearborn-based Econom ic Club of
D etroit on M arch 13, 1992, the
president said: “I am absolutely

convinced—absolutely convinced—
that in passing the NAFTA, the
free trade agreem ent with Mexico,
the N orth Am erican—we call it
N orth Am erican Free T rade Agree
m ent— it will create m ore jobs. I’m
convinced that it’s good for the en 
vironm ent. I believe a m ore pros
perous Mexico, and th e re ’s going
to be prosperity on both sides if we
can get the p ro p er kind o f agree
m ent, will be able to address itself
to these environm ental problem s. I
believe a m ore prosperous Mexico
will be an even better m arket for
US goods. And so I do n o t accept
the wisdom o f some that says that a
trade agreem ent is going to result
simply in an export o f jobs. It is not
going to do that, and I believe that
we ought to keep pressing for it. I
d o n ’t care what the politics o f it
are. I think it is best and I want to
do exactly the same thing— this
NAFTA, this N orth Am erican Free
T rade A greem ent—I want to do ex
actly the same thing with the suc
cessful conclusion o f the Uruguay
R ound.”

On the Move
Stuart Lippe, who formerly served
in the US Foreign Service, has
jo in e d Radio Marti as director of
research.
David E. Lewis has been appointed
the new assistant secretary o f state
for C aribbean developm ent o f the
Departamento deEstado o f the gov
ern m en t o f P uerto Rico. Lewis for
merly worked in Nicaragua at the
Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Economicas y Sociales (CRIES)
and with the Ford Foundation.
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Venezuela: Reversal or Renewal?
by Andres Serbin

. . .

Democracy and civilian control over the military have distinguished Venezuela
from the bulk of Latin American states. Did the country’s attempted coup of 1992
portend the reversal of regional progress toward democracy and demilitarization?
he attem pted coup against
V enezuelan president
Carlos Andres Perez on
February 4, 1992, was par
ticularly surprising be
cause, for m ore than
three decades, Venezuela has been
politically atypical am ong Latin
Am erican countries. This atypical
status derived from four political
features: first, a stable democracy,
based on the consensus o f the lead
ing political parties; second, civil
ian control over the arm ed forces,
including rotation o f com m anders,
nonintervention in political life,
and generous social benefits; third,
social democracy, characterized by
a capacity to perm it the upward so
cial mobility o f wide sectors o f the
population; and fourth, substantial
petroleum profits that have sus
tained this dem ocratic social and
political framework.
Fissures in this framework began
to appear shortly after Perez as
sum ed the presidency o f Venezuela
for the second time in 1988. On
February 27, 1989, an increase in
the price o f public transportation—

T
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introduced as part o f a severe aus
terity package that sharply diverged
from the populism o f Perez’s initial
term in office (1978-83)—pro
voked three days o f riots and loot
ing. For the first time since the
pacification o f leftist guerrillas in
the early 1970s, the V enezuelan

The political gap
separating the masses
from the Perez
government and party
constituenciesfrom
their leadership grew
increasingly wide.
army intervened to quell civil dis
turbances. T he num ber o f civilian
deaths probably exceeded the offi
cial figure o f 600. T he cost o f m ate
rial dam age in the country’s main
cities was extensive as well.
Nonetheless, this dram atic popu
lar response had little im pact on
President Perez—newly converted
as he was to neoliberalism — or the
political elite in general—which
was progressively losing political
touch no t only with the vast major
ity of Venezuelans bu t also with
their very own political parties. In
deed, during the subsequent three

years the political gap separating
the masses from the Perez govern
m ent and party constituencies
from their leadership grew in
creasingly wide, especially given
the sharp contrast between the
ostentatious lifestyle o f the Vene
zuelan u p p er classes and the wors
ening econom ic hardships o f the
rank-in-file population, m ore than
40% o f whom live below the offi
cially defined poverty line.
In this context, reinforcing the
political alienation o f the Venezue
lan majority has been widespread
and unpunished corruption. Nu
m erous scandals in cu rren t and pre
vious adm inistrations have involved
governm ent functionaries, military
leaders, and entrepreneurs. These
scandals have generally received
light treatm ent by a political system
whose appointed officials are de
p en d e n t on the old guard o f politi
cal parties. C om bined with the
harsh socioeconom ic conse
quences for most of the popula
tion, the im pact on public opinion
has been to underm ine the legiti
macy o f both the judicial system
and the political system in general.
T he com bination o f plunging liv
ing standards for V enezuela’s ma
jority and plunging confidence in a
political system increasingly identi
fied with elite corruption and os
tentatious consum ption is the
explosive ingredient that underlay
the attem pted coup o f February
1992.

From Macroeconomic Upswing
to Attempted Coup
Ironically, the deterioration o f liv
ing conditions for the majority, the
declining faith in the political sys
tem, and the attem pted coup coin
cided with the first positive signs of
President P erez’s neoliberal pro
gram: a 9.2% rate o f econom ic
growth in 1991 and a rate o f in
flation that did n o t exceed 30.7%.
Accompanying these signs o f re
covery was the growing confidence
o f foreign investors and m ultilat
eral financial institutions in the
V enezuelan economy, as well as
Perez’s early 1992 announcem ent
th at a large-scale social project
would be started to distribute the
benefits o f econom ic recovery
m ore equitably.
M onths after the coup attem pt,
there is yet little consistent inform a
tion about the ideological orienta
tion of the rebel military leaders.
Indeed, their attem pt to seize tele
vision stations failed, they m ade no
o th er m ajor efforts to disseminate
proclam ations th rough the mass
m edia, they b u rn e d their propagandistic m aterials when the
attem pted coup failed, and gov
ern m en t censorship has minim ized
com m entary on the opposition’s
motives. Still, the opposition’s
so-called Movimiento Bolivariano
expressed the discontent o f a sig
nificant portion o f the military’s
middle-level com m and. They were
unhappy with V enezuela’s socioeco
nom ic problem s, the corruption of
political and military leadership,
the weakening o f dem ocratic insti
tutions, and the frustrated expecta
tions of the masses. A nother source
o f military discontent was dissatis
faction over the long-standing
negotiations on the Venezuelan-

The “Golpistas”: Who Are They?
T here is a cottage industry o f books on the “F-4,” the February 4, 1992,
coup attem pt in Venezuela. T he chief conspirator, L ieutenant Colonel
H ugo Chavez, is being lionized by m any a politician and journalist.
While he, and his fellow conspirators, continue to have a popular fol
lowing, the polls indicate decreasing support for a military solution. In
a poll taken ju st four days after the coup attem pt, El Nacional found
that 37% supported the attem pt, 20% were indifferent, an d 43% were
opposed. By May 4, 1992, the same new spaper reported that 88% o f the
m ost recent poll favored a solution within the dem ocratic system.
T he golpistas claim to be followers of the doctrines o f Simon Bolivar
an d his teacher, D on Simon Rodriguez. While this explains the adop
tion o f the nam e “Movimiento Bolivariano" for their m ovem ent, it ex
plains pitifully little else. T he following inform ation on the golpistas has
been widely publicized:
» T hree o f the four m ajor leaders (L ieutenant Colonels H ugo Chavez,
Jesus Ortiz, and Francisco U rdaneta) had been u n d er surveillance for
the past eight years for their activities against what they called “the
oligarchical chiefs” of the arm ed forces. Two years ago they were ac
cused of planning to kidnap the top military com m anders (El Univer
sal, February 5, 1992).
■ T he total nu m b er o f acdve rebels was two battalions— the Paracaidistas deAragua and the Brigada Blindada de Valencia (with 30 tanks)— as
well as others stationed at M aracaibo’s missile base. T heir attack on
the presidential palace and o th er political locations was m et with stiff
resistence from the Guardia Nacional an d the president’s own guards.
T he threat that the loyal air force (equipped with F-16s) would be
sent into action was a m ajor reason why the golpistas surrendered.
* T heir surrender message noted that “for now ” they failed and that
“new situations will com e along.”
■ As far as any ideology or program , little is evident. T he oldest golpista,
L ieutenant Colonel Francisco Arias Cardenas, com m ander o f th e mis
sile base o f M aracaibo, speaks in Biblical terms about justice and h o n 
esty (El Nacional, M arch 5,1992). T he jo in t letter of February 12,
1992, by L ieutenant Colonel Chavez and others to the governor of
Zulia has a distinct Theology o f Liberation tone: references to Christ,
to the voice o f “the C hurch which is com m itted to the p eople,” “ideal
ism,” “participatory dem ocracy,” anticorruption, etc.
* O f the 357 officers captured, only 55 were still in custody by April 26,
1992.

Editor's Note: Information collected by H em isphere staff.
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Colom bian b o rd er in the poten
tially oil-rich Golfo de Venezuela.
T ogether, these sources o f mil
itary dissatisfaction intersected with
a diffuse and am biguous national
ist discourse, whose inflections
stressed the dom estic conditions of
Venezuela w ithout linking them to
hem ispheric and world trends. The
rebel conspiracy, however, was lim
ited to a few sectors o f the arm ed
forces and, apart from some late ef
forts to arm university students in
the city o f Valencia, failed to in
corporate civilians. Reflecting the
d epth o f discontent am ong the po
litically isolated golpistas at the m o
m en t o f surrender, their apparent
leader, Lieutenant Colonel Hugo
Chavez, declared that they would
give up “for now.”

The Aftermath
Following the defeat o f the gol
pistas, V enezuela’s party leaders,
entrepreneurs, labor unions, and
n eighborhood associations de
clared their support for dem oc
racy. Nevertheless, voices of
dissidence called attention to the
conditions underlying the at
tem pted overthrow o f the Perez
adm inistration. Am ong the dissi
d en t voices were form er socialChristian COPEI president Rafael
C aldera and leaders o f the Movimiento alSocialismo (MAS). Signifi
cantly, even though civilians did
n o t participate in the coup at
tem pt, public opinion polls re
vealed that m ore than 30% o f the
population supported the golpistas.
In short, beyond the attem pted
coup itself lies an alarm ing accu
m ulation o f popular grievances
th at the Perez adm inistration, as
well as the political leadership in
general, m ust recognize and re
solve. Unfortunately, so far there
are few encouraging signs o f such
progress.
O n the one hand, the Perez ad
m inistration has spoken no t o f a
m ajor change o f course bu t o f the
introduction o f “flexibility.” In es
sence, Perez has said that the only
significant policy change will be

Hemisphere • Summer 1992

the im plem entation of the “social
m egaproject,” for which he has ob
tained m ultilateral funding. Even
so, the recent decrease in the
world-market price o f petroleum
raises doubts about the ultim ate
scale of the program .

Thefundamental
challenge confronting
President Perez is
not that of improving
his government’s
image, but rather of
seriously reforming the
Venezuelan political
system.

On the o ther hand, Perez’s ef
forts to form a coalition govern
m ent, incorporating the leadership
o f his own party, Action Democratica
(AD), along with that o f opposition
parties, has proved unsuccessful.
The new cabinet that Perez ap
pointed following the coup
attem pt has no t substantially re
duced the adm inistration’s strong
ties to the technocratic team that
form ulated its original neoliberal
policies, though the addition of
some AD m em bers to the team has
m odified its approach and eased
tensions between AD and the Perez
adm inistration. T he new cabinet in
cludes as interior m inister form er
AD presidential candidate Luis
Piherua Ordaz, widely respected
for his honesty and seen as having
a key role in com bating corrup
tion. It also included as foreign
m inister, until he resigned in June
1992, a m em ber o f the social-Chrisdan party COPEI. T he socialist
party MAS refused to participate.
In apparent com pensation, Perez

also established a Consejo Consultivo
consisting of representatives o f AD
as well as in d ep en d en t and opposi
tion parties. This m easure, to
gether with the appointm ent o f a
new head o f the Ofitina Central de
Information, may improve the gov
ern m e n t’s lines o f com m unication
with the population in general. By
the same token, the transfer o f a se
ries o f corruption cases to the attor
ney general may, in the short term ,
improve the Perez adm inistration’s
image in the struggle against cor
ruption.

“For Now”
Yet the fundam ental challenge
confronting President Perez is not
that o f im proving his governm ent’s
image, bu t rath er o f seriously re
form ing the Venezuelan political
system. Such reform m ust establish
effective m echanism s for political
control over corrupt practices and
for political participation that re
sponds to the expectations o f di
verse sectors. In this respect, the
Perez adm inistration needs to im
plant a series o f proposals form u
lated by the Comision de Reforma del
Estado. Am ong these are proposals
to reform the electoral system so as
to elim inate the existing top-down
m anipulation o f electoral ballots by
en tren ch ed party elites (known as
“cogollos”) and to reform the ju d i
cial system.
If these and o ther serious politi
cal reform s are not carried out,
then sooner o r later the “for now,”
as declared by golpista H ugo Cha
vez, may internalize as a m ore
crystallized— and hence m ore ex
plosive—amalgam o f both the pop
ular protests o f February 27, 1989,
and the attem pted coup o f Febru
ary 4, 1992. Such an explosive
force not only could p u t an end to
m ore than 30 years o f democracy
in Venezuela, bu t also could por
tend the weakening o r reversal of
Latin A m erica’s regional progress
toward democracy. ■

(Translated by H em isphere staff)

Venezuelan Opinion
THE POLITICAL SYSTE

Which concept best describes
Venezuela’s political system?

Should political parties be abolished
because they are corrupt and ineffective,
or should they be changed because
they are necessary for democracy?

Dem ocracy (89.0%)

Should Be
Left Alone (4.0%)

Will political parties make
necessary changes to save
themselves, or are they
impossible to save?

Don’t Know/
Unanswered (7.0%)

Should Be
Abolished (7.0%

Don’t Know/
U nanswered (7.0% )
Dictatorship (5.0% )

S ource:

Another System (2.0% )

Should Be
Changed (82.0%)

Will Make Necessary
Changes (64.6%)

A dapted from El Nacional (C aracas)

M M

SHOULD PEREZ RESIGN?

EVALUATION OF STATE POLICIES

(PERCENTAGES)

PEREZ SHO ULD RESIGN

45

PEREZ SHOULD NOT RESIGN

45

DO N’T KNO W /U NANSW ERED

10

IF PEREZ RESIGNS,
WHO SHOULD BE NAMED INTERIM PRESIDENT?
Rafael Caldera

20

No one. Perez should not resign.

18

Arturo Uslar Pietri

9

Eduardo Fernandez

5

Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez

3

The Military

3

Don't Know/Unanswered

30

Several others were mentioned by 1% or less of the sample.
S ource: A dapted from El Nacional (C aracas)
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A Culture of Corruption
by Arturo Uslar Pietri

true culture of corrup
tion has been develop
ing in Venezuela for
m ore than 20 years.
C orruption is defined
as the process o f decom 
position, destruction, putrefaction,
and eradication that is produced in
living organism s when the vital
force th at gave them life and pur
pose has ceased to exist.
In the m oral field a similar
ph en o m en o n happens when the
individual or society enters, for
whatever reason, into a process of
disintegration, decom position, and
putrefaction, in which m oral values
and ethical principals begin to dis
appear and to be substituted by ab
je c t and base appetites.
Historically many societies have
been destroyed by this sickness. It
is active and present in all hum an
organizations unless a constant ef
fort is m ade to prevent it and to
create an efficient m oral prophy
laxis. H um an beings are not virtu
ous by nature, but we can acquire
virtue, in some sense, by profound
conviction. As Lord Acton said,
“Total power corrupts,” particularly
when dem onic tem ptation to do so
encounters no obstacles.

A

The Temptation of
Power and Excess
Venezuela was a backward and
po o r country at the beginning of
this century. Suddenly, in the last
q u arter o f a century, there ap
peared an im mense wealth that
n eith er governm ent n o r citizenry

Arturo Uslar Pietri is a political com
mentator whose columns appear regu
larly in El Nacional (Caracas).
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were prepared to manage. To
make m atters worse, this wealth fell
totally into the hands o f the state.
O ne could not expect the people
who have exercised the power in
Venezuela during the last 25 years
to understand and avoid the nega
tive consequences o f this rapid
wealth and channel it toward what
I called, many years ago, a policy of
“planting the oil”— the healthy de
velopm ent of the society and econ
omy o f the country. N ot only was
this not done, bu t because o f a
fatal weakness— the tem ptation of
power and excess and intellectual
lim itation— the elites, along with
the majority o f the society, scram
bled to take advantage o f that for
tune in all of its possible forms.
T he country was converted into
an im mense fools’ paradise, in
which all, as in a trance, stood in
line to achieve some share o f this
great supply o f personal benefits.
The governm ent becam e irrespon
sibly costly, propagating a lifestyle
o f ostentation, extravagance, and
pathological consum erism that
p en etrated all levels o f social life.
As such, no t only were the norm s
o f m oral conduct and intelligent
utilization of wealth perverted, but
there was am ple opportunity for
the proliferation of all imaginable
forms of theft, im pudent splendor,
illicit enrichm ent, and abuse of
power.

A Carnival of Appetites
The entire country seem ed to
subm erse itself in a carnival o f ap
petites. C onsum ption and ostenta
tion were reflected, according to
social rank, by Hollywood-style
mansions, fleets o f luxury autom o
biles and private airplanes, luxuri
ous apartm ents, shell enterprises,

risky business ventures, and all
forms o f pleasure and opportunism
afforded by political and econom ic
power. T he majority was n o t ex
cluded from this carnival o f easy
wealth. With an eagerness that
should have been directed to edu
cation or health care, the state has
sponsored and prom oted every im
aginable kind o f gam bling, includ
ing the easy money derived from
speculation. Consequently, regard
for work and savings has gone by
the wayside. T he gam esters’ state
prom oted, through every m eans of
com m unication, every gam e of
chance, from horse-racing and lot
teries to an evil com plex o f clandes
tine gam ing organizations, which
could not have existed w ithout the
large-scale complicity o f govern
m ent functionaries. To all o f this,
one has to add the virtual impunity
o f all those who have com m itted
crimes o f illicit enrichm ent.
This culture o f corruption is
corroding the soul o f the country
and cannot be confronted and cor
rected with m ere proclam ations of
intent to am end or isolated ges
tures o f repentance. We have to go
to the core, attacking the corrupt
practices o f gamesters, felons, and
the state. We have to establish effec
tive norm s and real examples of
moral and civic conduct. We have
to educate for work, savings, and
service and no t for the enjoym ent
o f easy wealth and splendor. This is
the challenge that Venezuela has
before it, if it truly wants to am end
its destiny, cure its vices, and reach
its true destiny. ■
Editor’s Note: Adapted from El Nacio
nal, March 8, 1992.
(Translated by H em isphere staff)
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Nova Scotia and the Fighting Maroons:
A Documentary History
Guest Editor
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Introduction
A Documentary History
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Resistance and Rebellion in Suriname:
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Venezuela in Crisis
An Interview with Rafael Caldera

r. Caldera, as one of the
originators of this political
system, you know it well.
When and where did the
first fissures in the system
become apparent?
Paradoxically the deterioration
in the system began when Vene
zuela obtained a fairer price for its
oil. W hen we sold oil at $2 a barrel,
even after we subtracted the cost of
production and split the rest be
tween the governm ent and the
m ultinationals, we thought of our
selves as relatively rich. We were
concerned at that time with correct
ing fundam ental affairs. Based on
the figures presented by the most
im partial economists, we now know
that we have never been as well off
as we were before the oil boom;
o ur gross national product grew,
we industrialized, unem ploym ent
was reduced, and inflation was prac
tically nonexistent, as was for all
practical purposes the foreign debt.
W hen the flow o f m oney started,
it eng en d ered two particularly seri
ous processes and trends: first, the
tendency to easy accum ulation and
earnings perm eated all social sec
tors, and second it reached into
the top political levels of the state.
This “facilismo” spawned a type of
corruption that we had com batted
tenaciously during the first 15 years
o f dem ocratic governm ent. The
fact is that in those years this de
mocracy had as goals no t only polit
ical liberty and respect for hum an
rights, b u t the battle against the

corruption that had been an inte
gral part of all dictatorships. I insist
on em phasizing this latter point be
cause it is now popular to say that
corruption is a result of 34 years of
democracy; it is not true that cor
ruption began with democracy, nor
is it true that there was no corrup
tion u n d er the dictatorship. W hat
is true is that it was the [Carlos
Andres] Perez adm inistration that
initiated the crim inal insanity of
contracting unnecessary debts.

The best institutions in
the world deteriorate
when they are in the
hands ofpeople
ivithout noble interests
and who use them for
their own convenience.

Given the extraordinary incom e we
were receiving, we could have u n 
dertaken great program s and
works for Venezuela w ithout get
ting into debt. Definitely this debt
is the cause o f the asphyxiating
pressure that the International
M onetary Fund is currently exert
ing on the country.
Are you sure about this?

Rafael Caldera was president of Vene
zuela from 1969 to 1974for the socialChristian party COPEI. He is expected
to run for the sixth time in 1993 as an
independent.
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I am positive. Additionally, one
of the very serious things occurring
in Venezuela is that we blam e every
thing on the system when it is peo
ple who are responsible. T he fact is

that institutions are good when the
people who m anage and represent
are honest and patriotic. T he best
institutions in the world deterio
rate when they are in the hands of
people w ithout noble interests and
who use them for their own con
venience.
What is the remedy: changing the
people without changing the system?
T he system . . . ? I wish you
would tell me what is the system
you are going to change. Are you
going to change democracy? Are
you going to abolish the congress?
Are you going to establish a m onar
chical constitution? T he reality is
that people speak o f the system in
vague terms, no one wishes to be
precise. Specifically we can im
prove the system by introducing a
series o f institutions or practices
such as the popular referendum , a
reform o f the judicial system, may
be by instituting the office o f prim e
m inister o r an om budsm an for
hum an rights. But all this presup
poses that the country’s established
dem ocratic constitutional system
will not be altered, what will be al
tered is how it functions. My spe
cific proposal covers seven points:
■ T he creation o f a high judicial
commission to represent n o t only
the legal profession but the coun
try as a whole. This commission
will select the candidates from
which congress selects the m em 
bers of the suprem e court. It will
also have the authority to dismiss
forthwith any m agistrate or
ju d g e— no m atter the rank—
when it is convinced that an offi
cial is no t complying with h is /h e r
judicial duty.
■ The introduction o f a funda
m ental charter regulating the

function o f political parties. This
should include transparency in
the m anagem ent of its funds and
setting limits to its functions;
since parties are the fundam ental
instrum ents o f democracy, we
should stop them from being the
m echanism s o f clientelism, of
pragmatism , and o f abusive pow
er; in o th er words, we should
avoid the so-called partidocracia
(oligarchy o f the party).
■ T he creation o f the post o f prim e
m inister who will share responsi
bilities with the president and
who can be dismissed with a vote
o f no confidence from the cham 
bers; once this occurs there will
have to be a shuffling o f the cabi
net.
■ The creation o f the post o f om 
budsm an for hum an rights so
that society can have a spokes
m an, a sort o f catarsis y de amparo
(a protector and upholder of
rights) when trem endous viola
tions are com m itted.
■ We need to categorically estab
lish the right to inform ation, one
o f the many rights that are essen
tial and clear to so many sectors
o f the society.
■ Any change in the constitution,
even the m aking o f a totally new
one if necessary, should require
the convening o f a constitutional
assembly th at responds to a popu
lar m andate, n o t to the will o f a
select few.
■ A nother very im portant m atter
that should go into the constitu
tional reform is a transitory dispo
sition that reduces the present
constitutional presidential period
by at least a year; in o th er words,
after m aking the constitutional
reform , we should proceed to
renew all public offices. T he oftrepeated phrase that this is the
last opportunity for democracy
truly applies to o ur situation. ■

;Ya salio la Guia del
Periodismo Centroamericano!
Esta publication
de 188 paginas
contiene:
• Nombres de mas de
3.000 periodistas
• Datos sobre
27 periodicos
• Information sobre 208
emisoras de radio
Detalles de 34 canales
de television
* Mas datos sobre
revistas y periodicos
• Nombres de las
escuelas de
periodismo y
sus profesores
• Las
corresponsalias

Y un ciimulo de information util sobre Centroamerica y Panama.
Solo 45 dolares.
Ingresos de la venta de la Guia estan destinados a un fondo para el
funcionamiento de un centra de entrenamiento para periodistas centroamericanos.
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ejemplar/es de la Guia del Periodismo Centroamericano

N om bre ____________
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Editor’s Note: Reprinted from Revista
ZETA (Caracas), March 12-23, 1992.
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C entral A m erican Journ alism Program
Florida International U niversity
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(Translated by H em isphere staff)
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Military Questions in El Salvador
by Jose Z. Garcia

..........................

Political crisis in the 1980s bolstered the military’sformidable power in Central
America. Paradoxically, however, it catalyzed a peace process that promises to
tame the military’s might Given the realities, is the optimism justified?

_ _ _ ______ I l _ _______ J S _________ ;
n January 16, 1992, the
guerrillas and govern
m ent of El Salvador
signed agreem ents e n d 
ing the country’s 12-yearold civil war. T he peace
accords owe m uch o f their success
to international pressure. By the
time the Bush adm inistration came
to office in 1989, US policymakers
were tired of funding the seem
ingly endless war in El Salvador
and wanted out. Moreover, the in
ternational collapse o f com m unism
was eloquent testimony that time
was n o t a friend to the guerrillas of
the Ejertito Farabundo Marti de Libera
tion National (FMLN). Success at
the negotiating table occurred
when b oth sides acknowledged in
ternational realities and agreed to
negotiate what am ounted to a
prom ise to reincorporate the guer
rillas into m ainstream political
life—a process that will take place
u n d er UN supervision and with in
stitutional m echanism s designed to
increase the public accountability
o f the military and security forces.
W hat rem ains unclear is w hether
there exists enough goodwill on
all sides to create a viable political

Jose Z. Garcia is director of the Center
for Latin American Studies at New
Mexico State University. He has written
numerous articles on the Salvadoran
armed forces.
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system when the international com
munity is distracted or has with
drawn from Salvadoran affairs.

What remains unclear
is whether there exists
enough goodwill on
all sides to create a
viable political system
in the absence of
international pressure.

O n paper the accords are ex
tensive and create institutions to
ensure com pliance. O ne thousand
UN observers will spend the next
few m onths supervising the dem o
bilization o f the guerrillas. A Comi
sion para la Consolidation de la Paz
(COPAZ) has been form ed that
includes civilians representing all
parties in the legislature. Its p u r
pose is to verify com pliance with
the agreem ents. O ne o f COPAZ’s
tasks will be to supervise the resolu
tion of land disputes between those
who hold title to land in areas af
fected by civil war and those now
occupying that land. A Comision de
la Verdad, com posed of form er

Colom bian president Belisario
Betancur, form er V enezuelan for
eign m inister Reynaldo Figueroa,
and US law professor Thom as
Burgenthal, has been appointed to
investigate and reveal the facts in
unresolved cases o f gross hum an
rights abuse com m itted by the
arm ed forces of both sides. And
a Comision Ad Hoc has been ap
pointed to evaluate and supervise
a host of reform s contem plated for
the arm ed forces.

Down-sizing the Armed Forces
Based on the accords, the arm ed
forces will be reduced by 50%, to
31,000 officers and troops. This fig
ure, however, represents roughly
twice the size o f the arm ed forces
in 1979, when the war began, and
is artificially high. For several years,
army com m anders, for various rea
sons, have exaggerated the actual
num ber of troops u n d e r their com
m and. T he figure 31,000 rep re
sents one-half the public security
forces, and in fact, may represent a
reduction o f only 10,000 or so. Fur
therm ore, the accords do not guar
antee a reduction in the size o f the
m ost politically relevant military
group, the officer corps, which, in
cluding security forces, currently
num bers some 2,100— twice the
size o f the 1979 officer corps. The
m ajor substantive change involves
the dissolution o f the five Batallones

de Infanteria de Reaction Inmediata
(BIRI) created to respond to
FMLN action. Some o f these, such
as the BIRI Atlacatl, have acquired
reputations as gross violators of
hum an rights.
T he greatest institutional distor
tion within the arm ed forces is
caused by the extraordinary num 
b er o f ju n io r officers who were re
cruited during the civil war. In
1991 approxim ately 1,500 first and
second lieutenants were in the
arm ed forces, twice as many as are
need ed to balance out the 540 offi
cers of higher grades. Any effort
m ade to cut military costs after the
war is likely to focus on these offi
cers. Nevertheless, since many of
them served in the m ost dangerous
positions d uring the war, the case
for cutting ju n io r officers is politi
cally sensitive. M oreover, some
observers fear the social conse
quences o f suddenly cashiering
700 warriors into an econom y that
suffers from high unem ploym ent
rates. O n the o th er hand, their
continued presence in the arm ed
forces is likely u n d er the best o f cir
cum stances to create a degree of
instability within the institution,
which could eventually have politi
cal significance. Salvadoran history
has known many instances o f intergenerational military conflict that
have evolved into larger national
power struggles.

The Tandona
W ithin the top leadership structure
o f the arm ed forces, no military
graduating class co hort group, or
tanda, in the past 50 years has been
as powerful as the famous class of
1966. T he “tandona," o r large
tanda, is so nam ed because o f its
unusually large size o f 46. By the
mid-1980s tandona m em bers occu
pied most o f the im portant troop
com m ands in the arm ed forces,
and after Alfredo Cristiani becam e
p resident in 1989, some o f them
moved into dom inant positions
within the defense ministry while
others m aintained key troop com 
mands.

As cohesive as they were power
ful, tandona m em bers were often
accused o f covering up for o ne an
o ther in suspected cases o f gross
violations o f hum an rights o r fi
nancial conflicts o f interest. Just
as resentm ent against their power
began to rise am ong ju n io r tandas,
one tandona m em ber, Colonel
Guillerm o Benavides, was accused
o f conspiracy in the infam ous 1989
Jesuit m u rd er case. Extraordinary
pressure by hum an rights organiza
tions and the US governm ent fi
nally caused Benavides to be tried
in civilian court— the first such

While Cristiani
may have sound
administrative reasons
to keep the tandona at
the head of the armed
forces, doing so mill
impede national
political reconciliation.
instance in Salvadoran history—
and resulted in a conviction carry
ing a 30-year sentence. R esentm ent
against the tandona on the part of
ju n io r tandas partly explains why
this punishm ent was accepted with
in the arm ed forces, even as resent
m ent against the conviction exists
within the military in general.
Tandona m em bers have recently
been replaced in all im portant
troop com m ands except the vital
Primera Brigada, and several m em 
bers accused o f various wrong
doings were sent abroad in 1991
or were otherwise isolated in incon
sequential posts. N onetheless, tan
dona m em bers retain significant
adm inistrative influence within the
arm ed forces since the m inister of
defense and o th er key m em bers of
the high com m and are tandona
m em bers. A nother factor con
tributing to their influence is the

fact that tandas immediately ju n io r
to the tandona are quite small, mak
ing full replacem ent o f the tandona
problem atic. Thus, the rem aining
tandona m em bers in the high com
m and are likely to retain their posi
tions o f authority—including their
still substantial influence over the
selection o f political leadership—
until 1994, when a new president
will be elected. By that time the
tandas o f the early 1970s will have
m atured enough to assume power.
To the degree that tandona
m em bers continue to be influential
within the arm ed forces, some
resentm ent against the army will
persist. T he tandona has becom e a
symbol— o f hum an rights abuse in
some quarters, o f corruption in
others, and, in general, o f the civil
war itself. While President Cristiani
may have sound administrative
reasons to keep the tandona at the
head o f the arm ed forces, doing so
will im pede national political rec
onciliation.

Postwar Politics and
the Armed Forces
A m ajor achievem ent o f the peace
accord process in El Salvador was
that for the first time since national
independence in the early nine
teenth century, the role o f the
arm ed forces has been debated,
negotiated, and acted upon by po
litical parties, the governm ent ad
m inistration, guerrillas, and the
military itself. This achievem ent
alone is significant and has im
plications at least as wide-ranging
as the results o f the negotiations so
far. Civilian actors are likely to in
sist in the future that the subject of
the arm ed forces rem ains on the
public agenda. If so, the peace ac
cords will have indirectly taken the
country a step toward the develop
m ent o f shared dem ocratic norms.
With regard to the military,
the m ost im portant feature o f the
peace accords is the separation o f
dom estic police functions from the
arm ed forces. T he accords call for
the creation o f a new entity, the
Politia National Civil (PN C), by the
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en d o f 1992. T he PNC will assume
the public security functions pre
viously exercised by the Guardia
Nacional, Policia Nacional, and Poli
na de Hacienda, which were con
trolled and staffed by the arm ed
forces. In addition, the PNC will
have its own training academy and
will be controlled exclusively by ci
vilian national governm ent officials
through the Ministerio del Interior.
These steps reverse a m ore
than a century-old trend in which
the arm ed forces exercised increas
ing control over both internal secu
rity and national defense. In 1912,
for example, the Guardia Nacional
was created by the arm ed forces
and placed u n d er their control in
o rd er “to protect private property
especially in rural agrarian zones”
(Revista de la Fuerza Armada [San
Salvador], 10:38, 1978, p. 17). By
the 1970s virtually all law enforce
m ent institutions were controlled
by the arm ed forces and were often
associated with hum an rights abuse.
Removal o f dom estic security
functions from arm ed forces con
trol implies far m ore than possible
im provem ent in hum an rights treat
m ent, however. It was through the
exercise o f national guard, police,
and customs functions that the
arm ed forces acquired sufficient
knowledge, networks, and pres
ence th ro u g h o ut the country to be
able to govern. And it was partly
through the exercise o f these func
tions that the military m anaged to
control the political activities of
its citizens from the 1950s to the
1970s, when the army controlled
an “officialist” party— the Partido de
Conciliation Nacional—that won all
elections. T he ruling Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) it
self was founded in part by the late
Major R oberto D A ubuisson, whose
support base included village elites
he had helped across the country
in his position as chief o f intelli
gence o f the Guardia National d u r
ing the late 1970s, when death
squads began to operate on a na
tional scale to elim inate suspected
leftists. In sum, removal o f police
forces from military control implies
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a m ajor reduction in the political
im pact of the arm ed forces on Sal
vadoran society, an o th er necessary
bu t insufficient condition for de
mocracy.

Ultimately thefuture
role of the armed
forces depends on the
quality of the political
system that emerges
during the postwar
period.

Future Role of the Armed Forces
D uring the civil war, the Salva
doran arm ed forces had to learn
how to fight a guerrilla war. Eventu
ally they also had to learn flexibility
in the art o f m aking political alli
ances, no t only domestically but
internationally as well. Now the
elim ination o f their internal secu
rity functions and the careful scru
tiny o f their political role will surely
teach the arm ed forces the costs of
overextending themselves as an in
stitution. Still, the Salvadoran mili
tary has survived, and after 12 years
o f war its basic values and m entality
rem ain astonishingly unchanged.
H ence, it is no t to the arm ed forces
that one should look for guidance
toward democracy, bu t rath er to
the postwar dynamics o f civilian
politics.
Ultimately the future role o f the
arm ed forces depends on the qual
ity o f the political system that
em erges during the postwar pe
riod. Since 1932 a small oligarchy
using military force has refused to
acknowledge the political legiti
macy o f large sectors o f the polity,
especially organized labor. This
refusal is the root cause o f the civil

war. From the 1950s onward, the
arm ed forces, as instrum ents of
this oligarchy, extracted increasing
am ounts o f power and privilege for
their services. By the late 1970s abu
sive military behavior becam e m ore
o f a focal point for opposition (es
pecially in the eyes o f non-Salva
dorans) than the less tangible b u t
m ore fundam ental relationship be
tween the oligarchy and o th er sec
tors o f society.
T hough the civil war is over, it
is unclear w hether these patterns
will reem erge. Democratic theory
and the experience o f o th er Latin
Am erican countries suggest that,
until all m ajor political actors can
agree to create and abide by rules
o f the gam e that limit coercive mili
tary involvement in politics, the lon
gevity o f the current peace process
is in doubt.
For the time being, interna
tional scrutiny and the transpar
ency built into the peace accords
will probably cause both sides to
abide by the agreem ents, albeit re
luctantly and behind schedule.
Com pliance thus far has been slow
on both sides. T he real test will
occur w hen the Left is able to
dem onstrate with ballots what it
could no t dem onstrate with bullets:
that it has strong political support.
W hen the Left dem onstrated
such support in the past, civilian
groups tied to the ruling oligarchy
were always ready to sacrifice de
mocracy. W hether the p attern re
peats itself again will dep en d on
the resolve with which dem ocratic
forces forge a. m inim um alliance to
preserve themselves. Finally, in this
postm odern civil war, international
interests—such as governm ents,
hum an rights and church groups,
and writers—played im portant
roles in articulating issues and m on
itoring events, including the very
negotiation o f the war’s end. Now
that the country is no longer en
gulfed in war and thus is no longer
a focus o f world attention, El Salva
d o r’s dem ocratic prospects depend
to a significant degree on the con
tinued scrutiny and passion of
these players. ■
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Taming the H onduran Military
by Steve Levitsky

n few areas o f H onduran soci
ety is the lack o f civilian con
trol over the arm ed forces
m ore m anifest than in the ju s
tice system. T he H onduran
military refuses to allow its
m em bers to be tried in civilian
courts, even when they com m it
com m on crimes. And civilian au
thorities, fearful of confronting
the military, do no t challenge the
arm ed forces’ claim to “military ju 
risdiction.” As a result, m em bers of
the military have becom e virtually
untouchable by civilian law. “In
place of a state o f law,” the Comite
para la Defensa de los Derechos Huvianos en Honduras (CODEH) re
p o rted in July 1991, H onduras “has
a state o f illegality.”
The H o n d u ran military, it
should be noted, is somewhat dif
ferent from those o f El Salvador
and Guatemala. Unlike the armies
o f its neighbors, the H onduran
army has never been linked to the
oligarchy, b u t rather has tradition
ally m antained ties with the pop
ular sectors. In the 1970s the
military governm ent of Oswaldo
Lopez Arellano (1972-75) openly
aligned itself with peasant and
labor m ovem ents against econom ic
elites. This explains why many H on
durans do n o t view the country’s
military as highly repressive. In
deed, the H o n d uran military’s
hum an rights record— though far
from clean—is considerably better
than those o f the Salvadoran and
G uatem alan armies.
T h at changed somewhat in the
1980s. U nder the leadership of
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General Gustavo Alvarez M artinez,
arm ed forces chief from 1982 to
1984, the military adopted a m ore
repressive orientation, cracking
down on unions, peasants, stu
dents, and leftist politicians in the
nam e o f “national security.” Accord
ing to CODEH, between 1981 and
1984, 218 political assassinations,
110 “disappearances,” and 1,984
illegal arrests took place. T hough
hum an rights violations have de
creased since the mid-1980s, Ameri
cas Watch reported that “political
killings o f student, union and peas
ant leaders continued through the
end o f ’90 and the first m onths of
’91.” Military officers were impli
cated in brutal crimes against civil
ians on several occasions in 1991,
yet soldiers are never tried in civil
courts and few are convicted in
military tribunals.

A “Shield of Impunity”?
The military bases its refusal to be
subject to civil jurisdiction on arti
cle 90 o f the H onduran constitu
tion, which declares that “military
jurisdiction is recognized for
crimes o f a military o rd e r.” Ac
cording to Colonel N apoleon
Santos Aguilar, the arm ed forces
in terp ret “military jurisdiction” to
include “all cases that involve offi
cials o r enlisted m e n ” in the active
service o f the military. Nonetheless,
lawyers, scholars, and politicians
across the H onduran political spec
trum are nearly unanim ous in in
terpreting military jurisdiction as
applying “strictly to military mat
ters” such as m utiny or other
crimes com m itted during war.
According to retired general
W alter Lopez, arm ed forces chief
from 1984 to 1986, the military
should claim jurisdiction only over

“internal crim es,” while “civilian
courts should try all o th er crim es.”
Leonidas Rosa Bautista, president
o f the Colegio de Abogados, expresses
a similar view. According to legis
lator Salatiel U rbina o f the Partido
Liberal, “All cases in which soldiers
are involved in crim es against ci
vilians should be tried in civilian
courts. If I am a soldier and I shoot
som eone in a bar, there is no rea
son for m e to be tried in a military
co u rt.” Yet the military claims ju 
risdiction in all cases where sol
diers com m it crimes. Since the
country’s police force and investi
gative bodies are ru n by the arm ed
forces, the military has been able
to ensure that its m em bers stay out
of civilian courts.
The problem is th at seldom
have military tribunals b ro ught jus
tice. Military judges are active mili
tary m em bers appointed by the
arm ed forces. Trials take place
within military installations, are
closed to the public, and are in no
way responsible to the civilian ju d i
cial system. “T he military justice
system’s track record is n o t very
good,” acknowledges one US em 
bassy official. “You’ve got second
lieutenants judging colonels, which
is very difficult to d o .” Lawyer and
legislator Luis A lberto Rubi o f the
Partido Liberal says, “T he army is
using military jurisdiction as a
shield of impunity. It’s totally un
constitutional. They’re ju d g in g
themselves.”

Judicial Weakness
Despite widespread opposition to
m ilitaryjurisdiction, few politicians
o r judges have challenged it. AJuly
1991 legislative proposal to “clarify”
the definition o f military privilege
was immediately buried in the H on

d u ran congress, and the country’s
suprem e court has thus far refused
to rule on any cases concerning mil
itary jurisdiction. Such a ruling
would set a p reced ent for future
civil-military conflicts by defining,
once and for all, the limits o f mili
tary jurisdiction.
“T he judicial authorities have
always been afraid o f the arm ed
forces,” said CODEH lawyer Linda
Rivera. Yet, M anuel Gam ero, direc
tor o f the daily new spaper Tiempo,
argues th at such fears are no
longer justified: “If the suprem e
court ru led th at these military
crimes should be tried in civil
courts, what would happen? W ould
there be a coup? W ould they kill
the justices? O f course n o t.” Ac
cording to CODEH, the justice sys
tem ’s “abdication o f civil authority”
is the fundam ental reason the mili
tary’s im punity continues to exist
in H onduras.
In 1991 civilian and military au
thorities clashed over the issue of
military jurisdiction in three m ajor
cases. O n each occasion the arm ed
forces openly refused to cooperate
with the civilian justice system, and
each time civilian authorities
proved unable to exert control.
In the first case, known as the “El
Astillero” massacre, Colonel Leonel
Galindo is suspected o f paying his
farm hands to attack a group of
peasant squatters on his land. Five
peasants were killed in the attack
on May 3, 1991. A military investi
gation concluded soon after the
massacre th at “no soldiers were in
volved,” and although Galindo was
supposedly taken into military cus
tody, he was n o t tried. As the massa
cre was a “com m on,” rath er than
military, crime, civil ju d g e Leo
nard o Banegas asked the arm ed
forces to release Galindo to the
civil court system. They refused.
Judge Banegas then petitioned the
suprem e court to rule on the case’s
jurisdiction, b u t according to
Linda Rivera, who represents the
families o f the m u rd ered peasants,
“Som ething always happens so that
the suprem e court doesn’t make a
ruling. ” Banegas adds that “al

though it hurts to say it, military au
thority is superior to civil authority.”
The military took similar action
in the case o f form er defense minis
ter C olonel Erick Sanchez, who on
Ju n e 9, 1991, shot civilian Gustavo
Funez, leaving him semiparalyzed.
Reportedly drunk and enraged
after an argum ent with a fellow
officer, Sanchez shot Funez, who
apparently was an uninvolved by
stander. After a b rief investigation,
a military tribunal absolved San
chez o f the crime, declaring that
Sanchez had shot the unarm ed

In 1991 civilian and
military authorities
clashed over the issue
of militaryjurisdiction
in three major cases.
On each occasion the
armedforces openly
refused to cooperate
with civilian
authorities.

Funez ou t o f “self-defense.” At the
en d o f 1991, Sanchez rem ained on
active military duty. According to
Rivera, also prosecuting the San
chez case, civilian ju d g e Wilfredo
M endez “never even began pro
ceedings” against Sanchez and “im
peded me in my accusatory work.”
Funez, for example, was never
called to civil court to make his ini
tial charges. Rivera called the civil
ju d g e ’s failure to act a “mockery of
justice.” Legislator Salatiel U rbina
says that “the fact that Sanchez was
declared innocent tells the world
that it is the military and no t civil
ians who rule this country.”
The m ost widely publicized 1991
case surrounded the rape and m ur

d er o f Riccy Mabel M artinez, a
high-school student whose m uti
lated body was discovered on July
15 o f that year. M artinez had last
been seen at a local army barracks
two days earlier, where she rep o rt
edly w ent to seek h er boyfriend’s
release from military service. Both
military and civil investigations
were launched, but when on July
26 civil ju d g e M aria M endoza or
dered the arrest o f two high army
officials, Colonel Angel Castro and
Captain Ovidio A ndino, the police
refused to carry o u t the order. Po
lice com m ander G uillerm o Pare
des told the press, “I am n o t going
to authorize this ord er . . . these
boys are in active service and we
have military jurisdiction .” The
daily Tiempo called Paredes’s state
m ent a “m anifestation of the dom i
nance o f military authority over
civil authority.”
T he army then took custody of
Castro and A ndino, refusing to
turn them over to civil authorities.
Judge M endoza petitioned su
prem e court president Oswaldo
Ramos to grant the civil court juris
diction over the case. Yet, after a
July 30 m eeting with arm ed forces
chief Luis Alonso Discua, Ramos
announced the case would be p u r
sued by both the military and civil
courts, thus refusing to o rd er the
military to turn over the two offi
cers. Earlier that m onth Discua
had publicly declared that Castro
and A ndino should be tried in mili
tary tribunals. Asked w hyjudge
M endoza was unable to take cus
tody o f the two officers, Ramos de
clared that the ‘judicial authorities
are powerless” and that M endoza
“is not the Bionic W om an or W on
d er W om an.”

Antimilitary Pressures
Two critical factors, however, inter
vened to prevent the m u rd er of
Riccy Mabel M artinez from being
forgotten, and may well have trans
form ed the case into a turning
point in H onduran civil-military
relations. First, the US embassy, vir
tually silent during the repression
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o f the 1980s, began to publicly
d em and that justice be done. On
July 23 Ambassador Crescencio
Arcos declared that there was the
need for “a ju st and transparent ju 
dicial system to resolve this and
o th er cases,” since “dem ocracy is
n o t ju st elections, but providing
every citizen, hum ble as he or she
may be, equality before the law.” A
week later the embassy called on
the H o n d u ran governm ent to
“bring the authors o f this horrible
crim e to justice,” and offered the
technical assistance of the FBI to
assist with the case.
Arcos’s un p recedented inter
vention m ade an im m ediate and
powerful im pact by strengthening
the position o f the civil authorities.
According to a US embassy official,
Arcos’s statem ent “allowed others
to com e o u t and criticize the mili
tary,” as politicians could “shield
themselves behind Arcos” in their
attacks on the arm ed forces. Em
bo ldened by the US position, su
prem e court president Ramos
declared on August 2 that the Mar
tinez case “has to go to the civil
courts. . . . Why do doctors, econo
mists, workers, peasants, and busi
ness people but not soldiers submit
themselves to civil law?” The mili
tary leadership, on the o ther hand,
d en o u n ced Arcos’s “intervention
into the internal affairs of our coun
try” and called for the am bassador
to be declared persona non grata.
It is evident that, given the ex
traordinary degree o f US influence
in H onduras, Arcos’s stance could
n o t be ignored. O n August 21 it
was ann o u n ced that defendants
Castro and A ndino would be tried
by the civil court system. At the
same time, however, the military
an n o u n ced that both officers had
been released from the arm ed
forces and would be tried as civil
ians, thereby avoiding a precedentsetting trial o f military officers by a
civilian court.
Few H ondurans doubt that
Arcos’s intervention was decisive in
the M artinez case. “If Arcos h a d n ’t
m ade that statem ent, the military
would have absolved the officers,”
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said a CODEH official. Still, do
mestic pressure also played a criti
cal role in the M artinez affair. The
brutality o f the m urder, as well as
the alm ost certain involvement of
military personnel, produced an
un precedented outburst o f anti
military sentim ent. A series of large
student dem onstrations in August
1991 frightened the military, which
responded by filling the capital
with soldiers. T he news m edia was
also very active, keeping the case
on the front page for weeks and
providing a forum for antimilitary
views. According to CODEH presi
d en t Ram on Custodio, the press
“played an incredibly im portant
role. . . . If the arm ed forces h a d n ’t
had to confront the press cam
paign, the student m obilization,
and international pressure, they
m ight have arranged the pardon of
the soldiers.”

“W e’ve Lost Our Fear”
T he M artinez case may have longlasting effects on H onduran civilmilitary relations. In addition to
strengthening the resolve o f civic
leaders, it has had an em powering
effect on the population in gen
eral. According to H onduran politi
cal analyst Victor Meza, the case
“perm itted antim ilitarism to be
come public . . . the army is no
longer a taboo subject.” This pub
lic em pow erm ent, sociologist Leti
cia Salomon has argued, “is very
prom ising because the m om ent ci
vilians feel they can challenge the
military and seek justice for abuses,
real changes will take place.” The
military is clearly on the defensive.
“Soldiers know things are no t like
before,” says the president o f the
Asociacion de Prensa Hondurena, Mi
guel O sm ando Mejia. “They have
to be careful. If they kill som eone
now, they may no t rem ain untouch
able.”
Several im portant steps have
been taken towards ending im puni
ty. In Septem ber 1991 the national
police opened up a com plaints of
fice, reportedly at the request of
the US embassy. Despite the fact

that those officers deem ed to have
com m itted crimes against civilians
are punished internally rath er than
sent to civilian courts, Custodio
says the office has yielded “some
positive results.” M ore im portant,
the suprem e court an n o u n ced in
Novem ber 1991 that it would in
vestigate both the Galindo and
Sanchez cases and make a ruling
on the jurisdiction o f each. Accord
ing to form er arm ed forces chief
Lopez, “If the court rules that these
cases belong in civil courts, two
things will becom e clear: one, that
high officers are involved in hu
m an rights violations, and two, that
these officers can an d should be
tried in civilian courts.”
So far, however, n eith er
Sanchez n o r Galindo have been
charged and the investigation into
the M artinez killing has moved
slowly, am id charges that im por
tant evidence has been tam pered
with. In addition, the July 1991
m urder o f hum an rights activist
Marco Tulio H ernandez and the
Septem ber 1991 assassination o f in
digenous leader V incent M atute re
main unsolved. Fear o f the military
has no t disappeared, particularly
am ong judges in rural areas. M ore
over, many question w hether the
cu rren t reform m ovem ent could
be sustained w ithout US pressure.
Legislator Luis Alberto Rubi asks,
“T he day we d o n ’t have Arcos,
what will happen? Will im punity
rem ain?”
Yet others m aintain th at the tide
toward civilian control over the mil
itary is irreversible. “Because we
have lost our fear o f the military,
the boots and the uniform s d o n ’t
m ean anything anym ore,” said Fa
ther Elias Ruiz, who has braved
death threats in his effort to bring
Colonel Galindo to justice for the
May 3 massacre. H ondurans can
only hope that his bravado is in
deed true. ■

Editor’s Note: Adapted with permission
from M esoamerica (San Jose, Costa
Rica), January-February 1992.

Guatemala’s Military Transition
by Gabriel Aguilera Peralta

ntil 1982 the G uatem alan
military exercised a di
rect role in the creation
o f a seemingly endless
succession o f authoritar
ian governm ents. The
massive corruption, electoral fraud,
and repressive politics o f these
regimes fueled b oth the contem po
rary econom ic crisis and a wide
spread and w ell-docum ented
climate o f grave hum an rights
abuse. In 1982, however, the presi
dency o f G eneral Rom eo Lucas
Garcia was overthrown in a military
coup, and a process o f dem ocratic
transition began. T he question is
why did some military circles de
cide to gam ble on an alternative,
dem ocratic path?
T he reason, it seems, was the
em ergence o f an alternative to re
pression as a strategy for defeating
G uatem ala’s insurgent movements.
In the conservative view, achieving
victory in counterinsurgency war
fare justified systematic military
reprisals against the general popu
lation, particularly those suspected
o f providing sustenance, protec
tion, and recruits to insurgent ar
mies. A m ore sophisticated, liberal
strain o f this philosophy sought to
m ake the approach m ore flexible
and effective by recognizing the
social-structural roots o f insurgency
and adding a new elem ent—psy-
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chological warfare— in an attem pt
to win the “hearts and m inds” of
the masses.

A second major step in
the development of the
theory of Guatemalan
counterinsurgency
warfare was the
military’s realization
that any society
characterized by
extreme poverty and
inequality would be
vulnerable to
insurgency.

T he m odernization o f counter
insurgency strategy, however, did
n o t end with the addition o f psy
chological warfare. A nother major
step in the developm ent o f the
theory, if no t the practice, o f Gua
tem alan counterinsurgency warfare
was the military sector’s realization
that any society characterized by ex
trem e poverty and inequality would
always be vulnerable to insurgency.
In that light, a strategy o f preven
tion would be a far m ore valuable
weapon in com bating insurgency
than psychological warfare, and
the key to this “preventive” strategy
would be to either satisfy the socio

econom ic and political dem ands of
the masses o r to create the percep
tion that such dem ands could be
satisfied within the institutional
channels o f the status quo.
This updated version o f counter
insurgency doctrine was refined in
b oth the Centro de Estudios Militares
and the Estado Mayor (the executive
body o f the arm ed forces) in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. It was
subsequently galvanized by the
strengthened military capacity of
the country’s guerrilla forces—
whose growing m om entum was
signified by their 1982 amalgama
tion as the Union Revolutionaria
National Guatemalteca (URNG)—
and finally p u t into practice u n d er
the two transitional military govern
m ents that existed between the fall
o f Lucas Garcia and the form ation
o f a constitutional governm ent
u n d er Christian-Dem ocrat Vinicio
Cerezo. Based upon their new con
ceptions, these interim govern
m ents im plem ented a two-pronged
policy. O n the one hand, they
launched all-out military offensives
that—at a terrible cost in lives and
dam age to the social fabric, particu
larly to indigenous com m unities in
the countryside— devastated the in
surgent support network and left
the guerrillas in disarray. At the
same time, they prepared for the
free elections that culm inated in
the Cerezo presidency by rebuild
ing the party system and creating a
constitutional assembly.

Political Consequences
T he ultim ate results, though, were
n o t exactly what the strategy’s ar
chitects had expected. To begin
with, the liberal wing o f military
leadership rem ained a minority,
outnum bered by a conservative
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tion o f courses such as hum an
rights, the incorporation o f rela
tively progressive civilian educators
into military faculties, and the ini
tiation o f civil-military leadership
forum s to discuss questions of na
tional security within the liberal
ized framework. T he latter have
been linked to the Centro de Estudios de la Estabilidad Nacional
through the past efforts o f a lead
ing military m odernizer, form er
defense m inister G eneral H ector
Gramajo, as well as to cu rren t plan
ning to establish the Escuela Supe
rior de Estudios Estrategicos. It is
through these reform s that the
m odernizers seek to eventually
alter the military mentality.

The Future of Civil-Military
Relations
Adapted from El Periodico (Barcelona), March 28, 1992.

military caste whose m em bers
feared that dem ocratization would
p resent new political opportunities
for the insurgents. A reflection of
this divergence was the debate over
ending the guerrilla war by m eans
o f a negotiated settlem ent. Presi
d en t Cerezo and the liberal wing of
the arm ed forces supported this ap
proach, suggesting an agreem ent
within the framework o f the August
1987 Esquipulas II initiative for
C entral Am erican peace and de
m ocratization. In contrast, the con
servative wing not only opposed
the approach but attem pted two
coups against the Cerezo adminis
tration.
Equally reflective o f the political
divergence between the military’s
liberal and conservative wings is
the persistence o f hum an rights vio
lations. It is well docum ented that,
in spite o f the country’s dem ocrati
cally elected presidencies, death
squads encrusted within the
governm ent’s national-security
m achinery and connected with re
actionary sectors o f civil society con
tinue to com m it serious and
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widespread violations o f hum an
rights. In this respect, the US Em
bassy, which has clearly supported
the military m odernizers, has
sharply criticized G uatem ala’s re
cord o f hum an-rights abuses, partic
ularly with respect to the m urders
o f US activists M irna Mack, Mi
chael Devine, and D ianna Mae
Ortiz.
T he split within the executive
ranks o f the arm ed forces leads to
a key question concerning the
long-range balance o f civil-military
relations: to what degree is the Gua
tem alan military willing to relin
quish its traditional spheres o f
power? While the liberal wing is
disposed to cede power in ord er to
u n dercut the insurgent threat, the
conservative wing is equally insis
tent that it m ust m aintain power in
o rd er to achieve the very same o b 
jective.
In any case, the liberalization of
the G uatem alan arm ed forces con
tinues with the introduction o f cur
riculum reform s at various levels of
training and education. Spearhead
ing the reform s are the introduc

Clearly the military’s liberal sector
has been strong enough to initiate
and defend G uatem ala’s transition
to dem ocracy as well as the internal
reform o f the arm ed forces. N one
theless, the future o f both political
dem ocratization and military lib
eralization is uncertain as long as
the country’s internal war goes on.
With this in m ind, what has been
the role o f civilian political players?
At first it was perhaps lim ited to
whatever political space the mili
tary was willing to cede. While Presi
d en t Cerezo initially attem pted to
broaden this space, two attem pted
coups forced him to take a defen
sive posture. His successor, Jorge
Serrano, who took office in 1990,
m ade his objective the strengthen
ing o f his constitutional authority
as head o f the military. T hough the
political dom inance o f the arm ed
forces rem ains solidly intact, Se
rrano has m ade substantial prog
ress with respect to selecting high
military officials and reducing the
military’s invulnerability to charges
o f hum an rights violations.
The clearest evidence o f grow
ing civilian power, however, is that
the military allowed Serrano to initi
ate direct negotiations with URNG.
As a result o f these talks, which
took place throughou t 1990, a

negotiated en d to the internal war
has becom e a distinct possibility. In
sofar as they have strengthened the
nexus between the governm ent’s
civil m achinery and the liberal sec
tor o f the arm ed forces, these de
velopm ents p o in t to a long-term
reorganization o f G uatem alan civilmilitary relations. In this regard, it
should be recognized that, as in
the case o f El Salvador, a successful
conclusion to peace negotiations
would be a definitive step toward
dem ilitarization and the redefini
tion of the military’s role. The lib
eral sector o f the arm ed forces
seems to have accepted this possi
bility.

Debate within the
Guatemalan armed
forces is beginning to
converge with wider
Latin American
military trends by
considering possible
new roles.
vation. For example, the G uatem a
lan military’s small air and naval
forces are already substantially in
volved in the interception o f drug
traffic. F urther, the military is de
ploying its system o f urban con
trol—originally constructed for the

c

counterinsurgency cam paign— to
com bat the widely recognized
problem o f urban crime. And the
military has acted to protect the
Biosfera Maya, an im m ense park in
the n o rth ern province o f Peten,
against incursions by illegal treecutters from across the Mexican
border.
T he G uatem alan military con
fronts a paradox: while political
crisis has led to the institution’s
growth, m odernization, and m atu
ration, Central A m erica’s em erging
regional ord er prom ises to de-emphasize the role o f military forces.
If this regional prom ise indeed crys
tallizes, then dem ocratic civil-mili
tary relations could well becom e a
C entral Am erican and G uatem alan
reality. ■

(Translated by H em isphere staff)
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sntral Am ericans’ efforts for human rights,
jstice, and democracy by providing:
nerica
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ings with Ministeachers’ union
Central American

Central America in Context
Slide Show presentations and forums on the historical roots
of current events with strategies for teaching Central American students and for teaching North Americans about the
region. . .

Model Educational Programs
The Books Project uses process-based writing strategies to
bring the voices of Central American refugee children into the
classroom as they publish their own bilingual stories . . .

C arib b ean C o n n ectio n s, 6 P art S eries!
7or brochure, order forms, or information:
eet, NW Washington D.C. 20037(202)429-0137, FAX (202) 429-9766
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tion o f courses such as hum an
rights, the incorporation o f rela
tively progressive civilian educators
into military faculties, and the ini
tiation o f civil-military leadership
forum s to discuss questions o f na
tional security within the liberal
ized framework. T he latter have
been linked to the Centro deEstudios de la Estabilidad Nacional
through the past efforts o f a lead
ing military m odernizer, form er
defense m inister G eneral H ector
Gramajo, as well as to cu rren t plan
ning to establish the Escuela Supe
rior de Estudios Estrategicos. It is
through these reform s th at the
m nHprni7Pr»{ s e e k tn p v e n tu a llv

Adapted fromYX Periodico (Barcelona), March 28, 1992.

military caste whose m em bers
feared that dem ocratization would
present new political opportunities
for the insurgents. A reflection of
this divergence was the debate over
ending the guerrilla war by m eans
o f a negotiated settlem ent. Presi
d en t Cerezo and the liberal wing of
the arm ed forces supported this ap
proach, suggesting an agreem ent
within the framework o f the August
1987 Esquipulas II initiative for
C entral Am erican peace and de
m ocratization. In contrast, the con
servative wing not only opposed
the approach b u t attem pted two
coups against the Cerezo adm inis
tration.
Equally reflective of the political
divergence between the military’s
liberal and conservative wings is
the persistence o f hum an rights vio
lations. It is well docum ented that,
in spite o f the country’s dem ocrati
cally elected presidencies, death
squads encrusted within the
governm ent’s national-security
m achinery and connected with re
actionary sectors o f civil society con
tinue to com m it serious and
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widespread violations o f hum an
rights. In this respect, the US Em
bassy, which has clearly supported
the military m odernizers, has
sharply criticized G uatem ala’s re
cord o f hum an-rights abuses, partic
ularly with respect to the m urders
o f US activists M irna Mack, Mi
chael Devine, and D ianna Mae
Ortiz.
T he split within the executive
ranks o f the arm ed forces leads to
a key question concerning the
long-range balance o f civil-military
relations: to what degree is the Gua
tem alan military willing to relin
quish its traditional spheres of
power? While the liberal wing is
disposed to cede power in ord er to
u n d ercu t the insurgent threat, the
conservative wing is equally insis
ten t that it m ust m aintain power in
ord er to achieve the very same ob
jective.
In any case, the liberalization of
the G uatem alan arm ed forces con
tinues with the introduction o f cur
riculum reform s at various levels of
training and education. Spearhead
ing the reform s are the introduc-

negotiated e n d to the internal war
has becom e a distinct possibility. In
sofar as they have strengthened the
nexus between the governm ent’s
civil m achinery and the liberal sec
tor o f the arm ed forces, these de
velopm ents point to a long-term
reorganization o f G uatem alan civilmilitary relations. In this regard, it
should be recognized that, as in
the case o f El Salvador, a successful
conclusion to peace negotiations
would be a definitive step toward
dem ilitarization and the redefini
tion o f the military’s role. T he lib
eral sector o f the arm ed forces
seems to have accepted this possi
bility.
As a consequence, debate within
the G uatem alan arm ed forces is be
ginning to converge with wider
Latin A m erican military trends by
considering possible new roles
ranging from antidrug trafficking
initiatives to environm ental conser-

N

Debate zvithin the
Guatemalan armed
forces is beginning to
converge with voider
Latin American
military trends by
considering possible
new roles.
vation. For example, the Guatem a
lan military’s small air and naval
forces are already substantially in
volved in the interception of drug
traffic. Further, the military is de
ploying its system of urban con
trol—originally constructed for the

E
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counterinsurgency cam paign—to
com bat the widely recognized
problem o f urban crime. And the
military has acted to protect the
Biosfera Maya, an im m ense park in
the n o rth ern province o f Peten,
against incursions by illegal treecutters from across the Mexican
border.
T he G uatem alan military con
fronts a paradox: while political
crisis has led to the institution’s
growth, m odernization, and m atu
ration, C entral A m erica’s em erging
regional o rd er prom ises to de-emphasize the role o f military forces.
If this regional prom ise indeed crys
tallizes, then dem ocratic civil-mili
tary relations could well becom e a
C entral Am erican and G uatem alan
reality. ■

(Translated by H em isphere staff)
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N e t w o r k o f E d u c a t o r s ’ C o m m it t e e s o n C e n t r a l A m e r ic a
supporting Central A m ericans’ efforts for human rights,
social justice, and democracy by providing:
Resources on Central America

Central America in Context

Tools for teaching K-12, college and community groups;
useful for ESL, Language Arts, Spanish, Social Studies,
Regional Studies; interactive lessons, bilingual texts, histo
ries, poetry, prose . . .

Slide Show presentations and forums on the historical roots
of current events with strategies for teaching Central Ameri
can students and for teaching North Americans about the
region. . .

Central American Tours

Model Educational Programs

Including school visits, village stays; meetings with Minis
ters of Education, U.S. Aid officials and teachers’ union
leaders as well as exchange tours bringing Central American
educators to the U.S. . . .

The Books Project uses process-based writing strategies to
bring the voices of Central American refugee children into the
classroom as they publish their own bilingual stories . . .

N ew T itles! C arib b ean C o n n ectio n s, 6 P a rt S eries!
For brochure, order forms, or information:
NECCA, Dept. H, 1118 22nd Street, NW Washington D.C. 20037 (202) 429-0137, FAX (202) 429-9766
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Baseball’s Caribbean Connection
by M artin F. M urphy

S u g arb all: T h e A m e ric a n G am e,
th e D o m in ic a n D re a m
by Alan M. Klein. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1991. 179pp. + x.
$19.95. ’
El B eisbol: T ravels th ro u g h th e
P an -A m erican P astim e
byJohn Krich. New York: Prentice Hall,
1989. 2 7 2 pp. + xv. Paperback. $8.95.
T h e T ro p ic o f B aseball: B ase
ball in th e D o m in ic a n R ep u b lic
by Rob Ruck. Westport, Conn.: Meckler,
1991. 2 05pp. + xx. $37.50.
arefoot boys playing base
ball with mitts fashioned
from milk cartons, any
ro u n d object serving as a
ball and any long stick as
a bat, with a sugar-cane
plantation providing the backdrop.
These images provide an irresis
tible hum an interest angle for
foreign journalists. Add multim il
lionaire Dom inican m ajor leaguers
and the story has the makings o f a
H oratio Alger tale—a seductive m o
tif for N orth Am erican audiences.
US newspapers and magazines
serve up a kaleidoscope of these
images th ro u g hout the year. U n
fortunately m ost of these stories
are the same. T he same images,
fallacies, and superficialities are re
peated. A uthors Alan Klein, Jo h n
Krich, and Rob Ruck set the record

B

Martin F. Murphy is associate professor
of anthropology and, a Fellow of the Kel
logg Institute for International Studies,
University of Notre Dame. His most re
cent book is Dom inican Sugar Planta
tions: Production and Foreign
Labor Integration (Praeger, 1991).
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straight on the past and present re
alities o f Dom inican baseball.
Baseball did no t arrive in the
Dom inican Republic with the US
occupation o f 1916-24, as many be
lieve. It came, rather, from Cuba in
the 1880s. T hough an im port, it be
came the Dom inican game. But it
was no t until Jackie Robinson—
am ong others—broke the “color
b arrier” in the 1950s that US majorleague teams took an interest in re
cruiting Dom inican ballplayers.

Poor kids are told
“you can make it,
if you try, ’’and that
“the streets of America
really are lined
with gold, at least
for professional
ballplayers. ”

Ninety percent of Dom inicans fall
into the category of black in US
racial taxonomy, a group that sim
ply was no t perm itted to play with
white major-league ballplayers u n 
til Robinson came along. To be
sure, Dom inicans did play N orth
Americans before then, b u t both
their team m ates and opponents
were African-Americans from the
N egro Leagues. With a few excep
tions—by and large standouts such
as Juan Marichal, the Alou b ro th 
ers, and the Carty brothers— Do
m inicans did not break into US
m ajor-league baseball until the

1970s. They now represent the larg
est group o f non-US b o rn players.
D om inican sports folklore and
sports pages m aintain their own er
roneous images. Poor kids are told
“you can make it, if you try,” and
that “the streets of America really
are lined with gold, at least for pro
fessional ballplayers.” Few kids u n 
derstand that the vast majority of
professional baseball players lan
guish in the rookie and m inor
leagues. Most o f those fortunate
and gifted enough to make it to
the US earn an average gross salary
o f less than $10,000 a year and re
ceive only $15 to $25 a day for ex
penses while they are on the road.
Instead of traveling in planes, they
ride up to nine hours a day in re
cycled passenger buses. And they
play ball seven days a week to
crowds that average less than 1,500
in such out-of-the-way towns as
Peoria and Utica.
In a conversation with a Do
m inican who played for a Chicago
White Sox farm team, the player
both lam ented and relished his
present and future. Over his first
hom e-cooked Dom inican meal in
eight m onths, he spoke about how
he was getting old and had, at best,
a few years left to make it o u t of
the A league and into the majors;
how when he n eeded a new m itt an
agent would provide it, hoping he
would someday sign a lucrative con
tract. He related to me the social
pressures he encounters when he
returns to his com m unity in the
Cibao, the fertile valley in the cen
ter of the island o f Hispaniola.
Family, friends, neighbors, and
hangers-on all assume th at he
makes millions o f dollars like
P edro G uerrero of the St. Louis
Cardinals. W hen he d oesn’t share
his “wealth,” they say h e is selfish

and tacano (ch eap ). In the midst of
the laments, he affirm ed he would
m ake it to the real W hite Sox team.
H e ju st need ed to work hard, not
be a “head case,” and “if God was
willing” he would someday play in
C hicago’s new Comiskey Park.
Dreams do n o t die easily, even
with heavy doses o f reality. Most
p o o r and working-class boys not
only fantasize about being in the
big leagues, b u t know som eone
who “was signed” by a major-league
organization. T heir friends or rela
tives seldom m ade it past the re
cruits’ academ ies in the Dom inican
Republic o r the rookie league in
Florida. Nonetheless, as a re
m inder th at some do “get called
u p ,” even the biggest superstars—
like Pedro G uerrero, George
(“Jo rg e”) Bell, Tony Fernandez,
and Julio Franco—spend the win
ter at hom e. Indeed, the guys to
whom the gringos pay millions of
dollars a year are never very far
away— a lesson I learned to my
em barrassm ent.
As I was riding a bus from the
capital city o f Santo Dom ingo to
San Pedro de Macoris in 1983, my
seat m ate struck up a conversation.
H e looked like m ost o th er 20-yearold m en from San Pedro. H e was
even wearing a Philadelphia Phil
lies T-shirt, as did many young Do
m inican m en th at winter, m onths
after the team had won the Na
tional League p ennant. H e told me
th at he played for the Phillies or
ganization; b u t I was n o t to be
duped. I was certain that the m an
had confused fantasy with reality;
there was nothing special about
him. Nine m onths later, however,
his picture appeared on the front
page o f the sports section o f the
Listin Diario. Not only was he in
deed a ballplayer in the Phillies

organization, bu t he had m ade it
to the “bigs” in grand style: Ju an
Samuel was voted 1984 N ational
League Rookie o f the Year by the
Sporting News.

Most poor and
working-class boys
not onlyfantasize
about being in
the big leagues but
know someone who
“was signed”by
a major-league
organization.

,

Sports and the Study ot Society
Using a variety o f disciplinary and
theoretical approaches, scholars
have dem onstrated that sport is a
valid area o f social inquiry and that
the study o f sport can inform us
about society and culture. But they
have set a difficult task for them 
selves. They m ust face two oppos
ing camps. Many in the snobbish
US intellectual com m unity like to
think o f themselves as somehow
above the study o f games. O n the
o ther hand, many sports fans want
to see sport on its own terms, not
clouded with social analysis and
comm entary.
In this setting, Klein’s Sugarball
and Ruck’s Tropic of Baseball at
tem pt to walk the fine line between
baseball lovers and m ore rigorous
scholars. T he two books amply
dem onstrate that the study of
sport, in this case, baseball, can be

intim ately tied to the study o f soci
ety and culture, especially the study
o f a particular society and culture.
Klein’s anthropological study is
organized aro u n d the them e of the
dialectic between hegem ony and re
sistance. Hegem ony, he argues, is
expressed in the control th at US
culture (in the form o f baseball)
and capitalism (in the form of
major-league organizations) exert
over Dom inican sport and society
in general. Resistance, he claims, is
evidenced by the national hero wor
ship o f Dom inican ballplayers who
have long dom inated the big
leagues—Ju an Marichal striking
o u t gringos, Pedro G uerrero or
George (“Jo rg e”) Bell blasting a
hom e run off A m erica’s best pitch
ers. Every hit, every strike pitch,
every heroic catch by a Dom inican
is a source o f national pride.
T he m odel is com pelling, b u t
Klein’s treatm ent of it is often
forced, and a num ber o f his state
m ents about the Dom inican R epub
lic are simply erroneous. T he most
striking o f these— that the country
exhibits the lowest per capita in
com e in the W estern H em isphere
(p. 9)— ignores, am ong o th er coun
tries, the Dom inican R epublic’s
closest neighbor: Haiti. Klein is at
his best when describing how Do
m inican players and fans behave in
the stadium and discussing the
young recruits— the “W annabees.”
These chapters provide eth n o 
graphic insights, bu t are u n fortu
nately tainted by the au th o r’s
preoccupation with differences
between Dom inicans and N orth
Americans. Klein seems unable to
in terp ret D om inican culture with
ou t constant reference to his own.
Rob Ruck is an historian by
vocation and a lover of baseball
and good literary style by nature.
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Unlike Klein’s Sugarball, whose pri
mary mission is to test scholarly
hypotheses through the study of
baseball, Ruck’s Tropic of Baseball is
unabashedly about the game itself.
His book, then, is written for fans.
As a scholarly work, however, it sub
tly teaches the history o f Dom ini
can society and culture to an
audience o f N orth Am erican base
ball fans. Indeed, his description
and analysis o f the developm ent of
baseball in the Dom inican R epub
lic is the definitive treatm ent of the
topic.
In ElBeisbol, journalist Jo h n
Krich employs a grander view than
that o f Klein or Ruck; he discusses
five principal suppliers o f majorleague ballplayers (the Dom inican
Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua,
P uerto Rico, and V enezuela). He
also approaches Hispanic Carib
bean baseball with no academ ic
pretensions and tells his story with
the wacky and whimsical flair o f a
H u n ter Thom pson. Krich’s ap
proach makes for fascinating read
ing—an adventure in the tropics,
with baseball and the history o f US
dom inance over Latin America as
the unifying themes. In short,
Krich has written a book for politi
cally progressive US baseball fans.
No fan can finish this book without
appreciating the social and politi
cal problem s o f Caribbean Basin
nations and the inequities in USLatin Am erican relations. W hether
discussing Mexican, Venezuelan,
or Dom inican baseball, Krich has
the unique talent of com bining
tales o f individual passion with
broad historical events. Sexual liai
sons exist side-by-side with racial
confrontations. Salsa rhythm s and
fried plantains inhabit the same
canvas with dictatorships and US
military occupations.
Krich’s wildest political fantasies
are found in his last chapter, “The
Reconquest.” Latin ballplayers con
q u er US baseball and society as
leftist guerrillas: “. . . all the Latin
leaguers simultaneously p u t down
their mitts and pick up machetes.
The banana republics becom e base
ball republics once and for all. And
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th at’s when the ho t po t th at’s been
cooking for a century boils over”
(pp. 269-70). Roberto C lem ente re
turns to lead the troops, Ju an Marichal’s tradem ark “high kick proves
useful in evading the barbed wire
on army bases” (p. 270), US gov
ernors and senators are replaced
by um pires, games are played in
“Anti-Yankee Stadium ,” and “the
White House becom es the Tan
H ouse” (p. 271).

As quickly as
Dominicans emerged
as solid and even
superstar major-league
players, professional
baseball’s popularity
in the country is
declining even faster

.

The Future of
Dominican Baseball
Baseball is still a vital part o f Do
m inican popular culture, bu t as
both Klein and Ruck rem ind us, all
is no t well in the Dom inican game.
As quickly as Dom inicans em erged
in disproportionate num bers as
solid and even superstar majorleague players, professional base
ball’s popularity in the country is
declining even faster. T he reasons
are myriad and diverse. They are re
lated to the declining quality o f win
ter ball in the Dom inican Republic,
econom ic crisis, and com petition
from an o th er US-born sport.
Major-league ballplayers who
toil for their millions o f dollars d u r
ing the sum m er in the US are now
reluctant to play during the Dom in
ican winter season. They argue that
they need to rest and cannot risk
a career-ending injury for a few
pesos. Dom inican fans grew ac

custom ed to seeing some o f the
w orld’s greatest baseball players dis
play their skills in their hom e coun
try. Since the mid-1980s, however,
few Dominican m ajor leaguers play
“winter ball” to audiences o f their
fellow countrym en, and those who
do so tend to play a shortened
season. Tony Pena, o f the Boston
Red Sox in the sum m er and the
Aguilas Cibaenas (Cibao Eagles) in
the winter, is the noteworthy excep
tion and thus is now a national
hero. Pena is no t enough o f an ex
ception to save attendance, how
ever. As Dom inican fans have come
to recognize the declining quality
o f winter baseball, the nu m b er of
fans present in the stadium has
plum m eted.
A nother key reason for plung
ing attendance is that the Domini
can econom y has been in shambles
since 1984. T he econom ic crisis
has b rought prolonged daily black
outs that limit night games. More
im portant, the lion’s share of
D om inican fans comes from the
working class, a group that can no
longer afford the admission price.
Ruck also notes an im portant
recent shift in sports interest in the
country: basketball is beginning to
supplant baseball as the Domini
can national sport. Many Dom ini
can youths now view baseball as the
gam e of the older generation, of
rural areas, and o f the poor. Bas
ketball is the new passion o f the
em erging urban lower-middle
class. Michael Jo rd an m ania is on
the rise in the Dom inican Repub
lic: Chicago Bulls T-shirts and hightop sneakers are now the youth
fashion rage, and the new-style
“w annabees,” “w anna be like M ike.”
So far, only one Dominican,
Tito H orford, has m ade it to the
National Basketball Association
(NBA) and his tenure was brief.
Will the second half o f the 1990s
bring an onslaught o f Dom inican
roundball players to the NBA?
Nonetheless, and regardless o f the
possible future success o f Dom ini
cans in the NBA, basketball in the
D om inican Republic, like baseball,
will always be a Dom inican game. ■

New and
Recent
Books on
Latin
America
Order from your bookstore or direct
from the publisher. Major credit cards
accepted. Call: (908) 932-2280

THE TIGER AND THE CHILDREN
Fidel Castro and the Judgment of History
Roberto Luque Escalona
Fidel Castro has long claimed that he would be absolved by history.
This volume tests Castro’s claim against fact and finds that history will
condemn the long-standing dictator of Cuba. Escalona’s work is filled
with a level of intimate detail unrivaled in any other analysis.
ISBN: 1-56000-027-9 (cloth) 212pp. $29.95
ISBN: 1-56000-593-9 (paper) 212pp. $14.95

POVERTY, NATURAL RESOURCES,
AND PUBLIC POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA
U.S.-Third World Policy Perspective Series, No. 17
Sheldon Annis, editor
Rural poverty and environmental degradation are steadily worsening
in Central America,undercutting the prospects for regional peace and
economic recovery.This volume analyzes strategies that aim to re
duce poverty and protect the environment in the region.
ISBN: 1-56000-015-5 (cloth) 280pp. $24.95
ISBN: 1-56000-577-7 (paper) 280pp. $15.95

REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY

transaction

Transaction Publishers
Department 492LA5
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, NJ 08903

A Handbook for Practitioners
Ernesto Betancourt
Betancourt shows how to evaluate the politics and actions of leader
ships in different revolutionary contexts (totalitarian, authoritarian,
and democratic), using the Cuban and Uruguayan experiences as
case studies.
ISBN: 0-88738-411-0 (cloth) 196pp. $29.95

ENVIRONMENT AND LABOR IN THE CARIBBEAN
Caribbean Perspectives, Volume 2
Joseph Lisowski, editor
This volume focuses on the eastern Caribbean, exploring aspects of
management and climate; social, literary, and educational concerns;
and includes an extended study of the labor situation in the U.S.
Virgin Islands.
ISBN: 1-56000-584-X (paper) 128pp. $19.95

CUBA ANNUAL REPORT: 1989
Office of Research and Policy, Voice of America-Radio
Marti Program
United States Information Agency
This annual statistical handbook provides fundamental data on Cuba,
including in-depth reviews of Cuban foreign policy, the national econ
omy, military allocations and manpower, political control, cultural
developments, and ideological shifts.
ISBN: 1-56000-016-3 (cloth) 350pp. $59.95
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Civil-Military Relations in Latin America
by M arian Goslinga

h ro u ghout Latin A m erica’s m odern history, militarism and authoritarianism have been the norm , and
dem ocracy and reform the exception. In the 1950s, for instance, 12 out of the 20 republics were ruled by
m ilitaryjuntas. Yet by 1961, 11 of the 12 had been elim inated. Only a year later, a new wave o f military coups
had begun as a result o f which, by 1964, seven new m ilitaryjuntas were in office. It has been estim ated that,
between independence and W orld War I, the Spanish-American republics experienced 115 successful mili
tary coups and many times that num ber o f abortive military revolts (Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin
America, rev. ed., Praeger, 1961).
In the 1980s and early 1990s the military seem ed to be on the retreat as country after country chose to experim ent
with constitutionally elected governm ent. N onetheless, recent events in Haiti, Peru, and Venezuela appear to have
swung the pendulum the o th er way. At the least they have proven that the Latin Am erican military rem ains a powerful
wild card. Until Latin Am erican dem ocracy is able to shed its eggshell fragility, this vicious circle is apt to continue in
definitely.
T he literature listed below is one indicator of the durability of military influence on Latin A m erican governm ent
and political affairs.

T

Una aproximacion al rol y a las tareas pendientes de las Fuerzas Ar
madas en la transition paraguaya a
la democracia. Ambal Regis Ro
m ero. Perspectiva International
Paraguaya, v. 2 (January/June
1990), p. 95-116. [Analyzes the
military’s role in Paraguay since
the downfall o f the Stroessner re
gime in February 1989.]
Argentina y los nexos militares.
Leobardo U rrutia Juarez. Hispano
Americano, v. 99 (August 1991),
p. 39. [Describes the governm ent’s
efforts to break up the m oney laun
dering and drug trafficking begun
u n d er the military regime.]
Argentina’s “Dirty War”: An In
tellectual Biography. Donald C.
Hodges. Austin: University o f Texas
Press, 1991. 387 p. $37.50. [Exam
ines the interaction between the
arm ed forces, guerrillas, and or
ganized labor since the 1930s, fo
cusing on the 1970s and 1980s.]

Marian Goslinga is the Latin Ameri
can and Caribbean librarian at Florida
International University.
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Argentina, el ejercito que tenemos.
Jorge Grecco, Gustavo Gonzalez. Bue
nos Aires: Editorial Sudam ericana,
1990. 220 p. [An institutional por
trait of A rgentina’s arm ed forces
based on interviews with their lead
ers and o ther m em bers of the de
fense community.]
Between Confrontation and Ac
commodation: Military and Gov
ernment Policy in Democratic
Argentina. David Pion-Berlin. /owrnal of Latin American Studies, v. 23
(O ctober 1991), p. 543-71. [Dis
cusses civil-military relations in Ar
gentina and the policies o f Raul
Alfonsin during 1983-89.]
Beyond Elections. Tina Rosenberg.
Foreign Policy, no. 84 (Fall 1991),
p. 72-91. [Discusses the military’s
role in Latin America in general.]
De Geisel a Collor: o balan^o da
transigao. Bolivar Lamounier. Sao
Paulo: Sumare, 1990. 197 p. [Dis
cusses the transition from military
governm ent to civilian rule in Bra
zil during 1974-89.]
Democracy vs. National Security:
Civil-Military Relations in Latin

America. Paul W. Zagorski. Boulder,
Colo.: L. R ienner Publishers, 1992.
217 p. $35.00; $16.95 paper. [Ana
lyzes the problem o f establishing
civilian control over the arm ed
forces in the Latin Am erican de
mocracies.]
El Salvador: The Military and Poli
tics. M artin C. Needier. Armed
Forces and Society, v. 17 (Sum m er
1991), p. 569-88.
En nombre de Dios. Raul Marin.
Pensamiento Propio, v. 9, no. 7 (January-February 1991), p. 20-21. [Ex
am ines G uatem alan president
Jorge Serrano Elias’s prom ise to
bring the arm ed forces u n d er civil
ian rule.]
Explaining the Long-Term Main
tenance o f a Military Regime:
Panama Before the U.S. Invasion.
Steve C. Ropp. World Politics, v. 44
(January 1992), p. 210-34.
From Military to Civilian Rule.
Constantine P. Danopoulos. London:
Routledge, 1992. 256 p. $79.95.
[Examines civil-military relations in
South America, C entral America,
and the Dom inican Republic.]

Las fuerzas armadas y la transition
a la democracia en America Latina.
Gustavo Cuevas Farren. Politico,
nos. 2 2 /2 3 (June 1991), p. 83-99.
[Discusses the military’s attitudes
towards the dem ocratization pro
cesses in A rgentina, Brazil, and
Uruguay.]
Gewerkschaften und Militarregierung in Peru. Achim Wachendorf.
H eidelberg: H eidelberger Verlaganstalt, 1989. 553 p. [Discusses
relations between labor unions and
the military in Peru, 1968-80.]
Honduras. Jen n ifer Rosenberg.
Mesoamerica, v. 10, no. 11 (Novem
ber 1991), p. 9-10. [Reviews the
growing controversy over the
military’s role in the country.]
Is Democracy Possible in Haiti?
Ernest H. Preeg. North-South, v. 1,
no. 1 (June 1991), p. 34-39. [Dis
cusses H aiti’s political situation
after the February 7, 1991, election
o f Jean-B ertrand Aristide and ques
tions the stability o f Haitian dem oc
racy.]
Militarism and Politics in Latin
America: Peru from Sanchez Cerro
to Sendero Luminoso. Daniel M.
Masterson. New York: Greenwood
Press, 1991. 345 p. [Analyzes P eru ’s
political situation during 1930-68
with em phasis on the role o f the
arm ed forces.]
The Military and the Politics o f
Change in Guyana. Ivelav L. Grif
fith. Journal of Interamerican Studies
and World Affairs, v. 33 (Sum m er
1991), p. 141-73. [Discusses devel
opm ents since independence with
emphasis on the 1980s.]

Military Bureaucracy, Political Op
position, and Democratic Transi
tion. Alex E. Fernandez Jilberto;
Anfbal Yariez, trans. Latin American
Perspectives, v. 18 (W inter 1991),
p. 33-65. [Discusses C hile’s political
scenario after A llende’s defeat.]
The Military in Latin America: Is
the Retreat for Good? Fernando
Bustam ante. Bulletin of Peace Pro
posals, v. 21 (D ecem ber 1990),
p. 371-84. [Presents the possibility
of a reversal in the pervasive trend
towards military coups and repres
sive m ilitaryjuntas o f the 1970s.]
The Military Regime and the Re
structuring o f Land Tenure. Patri
cio Silva; Nancy Plankey Videla,
trans. Latin American Perspectives,
v. 18 (W inter 1991), p. 15-32. [Fo
cuses on C hile’s Pinochet dictator
ship.]
;Mision cumplida?: Civil-Military
Relations and the Chilean Political
Transition. Brian Lovem an.Journal
of Interamerican Studies and World Af
fairs, v. 33, no. 3 (Fall 1991), p. 3574. [Reviews the constitutional
fram ework that has em erged since
1973 and examines the tensions fol
lowing the installation of a civilian
governm ent in 1990.]
Mobilization at the Grassroots:
Shantytowns and Resistance in Au
thoritarian Chile. Cathy Schneider.
Latin American Perspectives, v. 18
(W inter 1991), p. 92-112. [De
scribes the opposition in the “poblaciones" to the military regime.]
A Nation o f Enemies: Chile under
Pinochet. Pamela Constable, Arturo
Valenzuela. New York: N orton,
1991. 367 p. [Describes political
and social developm ents, focusing

on the attitudes and interests o f var
ious social groups.]
The Next Steps in Central Amer
ica. Bruce L. R. Smith, ed. Washing
ton: Brookings Institution, 1991.
87 p. $9.95. [Paper presented at a
conference held in W ashington,
DC, Ju n e 19-21, 1990; discusses po
litical, econom ic, and military is
sues.]
Nicaragua’s Permanent Crisis: Rul
ing from Above and Below. Mark
A. Uhlig. Survival, v. 33 (Septem 
b e r/O c to b e r 1991), p. 401-23.
[Discusses the relations between
Violeta C ham orro’s governm ent
and the Frente Sandinista military
forces.]
Uma nova concepcao estrategica
para o Brasil: um debate necessario. A rm ando A. F. Vidigal. Politica
eEstrategia, v. 7, no. 3 (July-Septemb er 1991), p. 304-24. [Focuses on
Brazil’s military strategy within the
context o f a new international su
perpow er structure.]
O f Victims and Executioners: Ar
gentine State Terror, 1975-1979.
David Pion-Berlin, George A.
Lopez. International Studies Quar
terly, v. 35 (M arch 1991), p. 63-86.
[Data from A rgentina’s Comision
Nacional sobre la Desaparicion de Per
sonas (CONADEP).]
“Order and Progress”: A Political
History o f Brazil. Ronald M. Schnei
der. Westview Press, 1991. 486 p.
$55.00. [Traces the course of rep re
sentative dem ocracy in Brazil with
em phasis on the military’s role.]
Organization o f American States
Repudiates Suriname Military
Coup. Luigi R. Einaudi. Foreign

Hemisphere • Summer 1992
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Policy Bulletin, v. 1 (January/A pril
1991), p. 136-37. [Includes the
statem ent o f the OAS Perm anent
Council o f D ecem ber 28, 1990, as
well as the text o f Resolution 554.]
Panama. Steve Levitsky. Mesoamerica, v. 10, no. 7 (July 1991),
p. 11-12. [Summarizes the plan to
abolish the military.]
Politics and Identity in the Argen
tine Army: Cleavages and the Gen
erational Factor. Silvio Waisbord.
Latin American Research Review,
v. 26, no. 2 (Spring 1991), p. 15764. [Discusses the military’s chang
ing role in dem ocratic A rgentina.]
The Popular Sector Response to an
Authoritarian Regime: Shantytown
Organizations since the Military
Coup. Philip O xhorn. Latin Ameri
can Perspectives, v. 18 (W inter 1991),
p. 66-91. [A new look at civil-military relations in Chile.]
Presidential Elections and Political
Transition in Latin America. Helgio Trindale. International Social
ScienceJournal, v. 43 (May 1991),
p. 301-14.
El proceso de dialogo-negociacion
durante el primer ano de ARENA
[Alianza Republicana Nacionalista]. Carlos Lozada. Estudios Centroamericanos (ECA), v. 45, nos.
500-501 (June-July 1991), p. 439-63.
[Describes ARENA’S first year in
power and its relations with the
Salvadoran arm ed forces.]
Reconceptualizing Latin American
Authoritarianism in the 1970’s:
From Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism to Neoconservatism. H ector E.
Schamis. Comparative Politics, v. 23
(January 1991), p. 201-20.
The Root o f All Evil. A. Cockburn,
R. McKerrow. New Statesman Society,
v. 4 (M arch 15, 1991), p. 22-23.
Seguridad y democracia: el debate
sobre la defensa comun del hemisferio recien comienza. Ana
Baron. Somos,v. 14, no. 772 (July
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15, 1991), p. 57. [Discusses the de
fense o f dem ocracy in the event of
a new tide o f military coups in
Latin America.]
Sin novedad en el frente. Grace
Gibson. QuePasa, no. 1063 (August
1991), p. 12-13. [Discusses the im
proving relations between the mili
tary and the governm ent in Chile.]
Social Action and Development:
The Case o f Brazil. C. A. Medina.
Community Development Journal,
v. 26, no. 3 (July 1991), p. 172-77.
[Traces the demise o f military dicta
torships in Latin America during
the 1980s with special reference to
the growth o f social m ovem ents in
Brazil.]
The Struggle for Democracy in
Chile, 1982-1990. Paul W. Drake,
IvanJaksic, eds. Lincoln: University
o f Nebraska Press, 1991. 321 p.
La transition chilena: un corte de
caja. M anuel A. G arreton. Nexos,

v. 14, no. 159 (March 1991), p. 4550. [Discusses the challenges facing
the Aylwin governm ent as it moves
towards consolidating dem ocracy
in Chile.]
The Unfinished Republic: Brazil.
Jose Murillo de Carvalho. Americas,
v. 48, no. 2 (O ctober 1991), p. 13942. [Discusses the civil-military rela
tions u n d er D eodoro de Fonseca.]
Which Path to Peace: Reorienting
Central America’s Armed Forces.
Michael Dewar. International Defense
Review, v. 24, no. 7 (July 1991),
p. 706-7. [Describes the changing
focus o f the arm ed forces in Nicara
gua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and
H onduras.]
Whither the Latin American Mili
tary? Gabriel Marcella. North-South,
v. 1, no. 2 (August-September
1991), p. 34-37. [Discusses the chal
lenge facing Latin America of inte
grating the military into society
and asserting civilian control.]
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The C hanging
H em ispheric
Trade E n viro nm en t:
O p p o rtu n ities and
O bstacles
M ark B. Rosenberg, Editor
Leading international trade specialists analyze options for hemispheric
trade, including the likely impact of a North American free trade
agreement and a single European market and the roles of Japan and the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Contributors: Luis Abugattas, Myles Frechette, Marian Goslinga, Wolf
Grabendorff, Gary C. Hufbauer, Tetsuro lino, Carolyn Lamm, Henry Nau,
Riordan Roett, Mark B. Rosenberg, Jeffrey J. Schott, Barbara Stallings.
September 1991. 165 pp. 6 x 9.
ISBN 1-879862-01-8 Paperback, $11.95 (S/H, add $1.25 per book).
Order direct from: Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC),
Florida International University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199.
Visa and MasterCard orders: (305) 348-2894 or fax (305) 348-3593.
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